

The Ukraine List (UKL) #430  
compiled by Dominique Arel  
Chair of Ukrainian Studies, U of Ottawa  
www.ukrainianstudies.uottawa.ca  
9 October 2008

\*\*Three major events in Ukrainian Studies coming up: the 2008 Danyliw Seminar, the Famine Conference at Harvard, and the ASN 2009 Proposal Deadline (5 November). Meanwhile, Ukraine will have its third parliamentary election in three years. Most experts the Yushchenko Bloc, in whichever reconfiguration, to take a beating in the polls, which could very well happen. The other unknown, however, is whether the Tymoshenko Bloc will keep its electoral base, which remains massively in Central and Western Ukraine, following its substantive policy shift regarding the Russian question, both externally (relations with Russia) and domestically (status of the Russian language). –DA\*\*

\*\*Fourth Annual Danyliw Research Seminar in Contemporary Ukrainian Studies  
Chair of Ukrainian Studies, University of Ottawa, 23-25 October 2008\*\*

2-Conference, “The Great Famine in Ukraine: The Holodomor and Its Consequences, 1933 to the Present,” Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute, 17-18 November 2008

3-ASN 2009 World Convention: Call for Papers (5 November 2008 Proposal Deadline)

4-Ukrains’ka pravda: Yushchenko’s TV Address on New Elections (8 October)

5-Kyiv Post: December 7 Elections (8 October)

6-New Publication on Contemporary Ukraine: Ukraine Analyst

7-Ukraine Analyst: Western Experts on Ukraine Crisis (Arel, Hale, Way, Pifer)

8-Ukraine Insider: Ivan Lozowy, Third Time the Charm? (24 September)

9-Committee of Voters of Ukraine: Is Ukraine Ready for Early Elections?

\*\*Ukraine and the War in Georgia\*\* [UKL translations]

10-Our Ukraine Draft Resolution in the Rada (2 September)

11-Tymoshenko Bloc Draft Resolution in the Rada (2 September)

12-KIIS Survey Data on Popular Perceptions of the War in Ukraine (14 September)

13-Eurasia Daily Monitor: Russian Passports as Moscow’s Tool (15 September)

14-Argumenty Nedeli (Russia): Passport Hysterics

15-Wall Street Journal: Germany Opposes Ukraine Accession to NATO (3 October)

16-Atlantic Council: Alexander J. Motyl, Can Europe Survive Germany?

17-Neue Zürcher Zeitung: Cold and Hot from Russia [UKL translation]

18-Financial Times: EU’s Rebuff for Ukraine Sours Summit

19-Le Monde (France): Ukraine a “European State”? Not So Clear [UKL translation]

20-La Presse (Canada): After Georgia, What’s Next for Russia? [UKL translation]

21-Kyiv Post: Taras Kuzio, Kuchma Does Not Deserve Peace

22-Eurasia Daily Monitor, Ukraine, Vanco Energy, and the Russian Mob

23-New Book: Vlad Naumescu, Religious Processes and Social Change in Ukraine

24-Book Award: Catherine Wanner, Communities of the Converted

\*\*Thanks to Nykolai Bilaniuk, Larissa Blavatska, Orest Deychakiwsky, David Johnson, Valeriy Khmelko, Serhiy Kudelia, Taras Kuzio, Ivan Lozowy, Lama Mourad, Vlad Naumescu, Blair Ruble (Kennan Institute), Catherine Wanner and Vitaliy Voznyak\*\*

#1

Fourth Annual Danyliw Research Seminar in Contemporary Ukrainian Studies

Chair of Ukrainian Studies, University of Ottawa, 23-25 October 2008

The Chair of Ukrainian Studies, with the support of the Wolodymyr George Danilyw Foundation, is pleased to invite you to attend the Fourth Annual Danyliw Research Seminar on Contemporary Ukraine at the University of Ottawa on 23-25 October 2008, under the direction of Dominique Arel, Chairholder. The Seminar will be held on the University of Ottawa campus (The Lounge, New Residence, 90 University Private. Click here for the campus map:

[http://www.uottawa.ca/map/campus\\_map.pdf](http://www.uottawa.ca/map/campus_map.pdf)

The New Residence is located at the center top of the map, near parking lot K.

Twenty-six panelists, from Ukraine, the Netherlands, the UK, Canada, and the United States, will take part in the event. The full program can be accessed here. The 2008 Seminar will touch upon three major themes: The Politics of Memory, Ukrainian Security, and Contemporary Socio-Economic Issues.

The first section of the Seminar, on Thursday October 23, 1.30-6 PM will be devoted to the “75th Anniversary of the Ukrainian Famine-Holodomor” with papers on the political and legal recognition of the Famine, the comparison with Nazi aims in Ukraine during World War II and broader issues of History and Memory.

The opening reception will be held on Thursday, October 23, at 6:15 PM at the Resto-Pub Jazzy, University Centre, 85 University St., on the 1st Floor.

The second section (Friday October 24), “Contested Memory of World War II Violence in Ukraine” will feature two sessions: “Commemorating, Insurgency and Deportations” (9-11 AM) and “The OUN and World War II Violence” (11:30 AM- 1:30 PM)

The third section “The Choice of Ukraine” begins on Friday October 24 with a special roundtable on The War in Georgia and Its Implications for Ukraine’s Security (3:00-5:30 PM), featuring three speakers. The final section, on Saturday, October 25, will be devoted to contemporary domestic issues, with papers on themes ranging from corruption, gender politics, the resurgence of trade unions, and the legacy of colored revolutions.

The aim of the Danyliw Seminar is to provide a unique forum for researchers from Canada and internationally - from the disciplines of political science, anthropology, sociology, geography, economics and history - to engage in fruitful inter-disciplinary dialogue, disseminate cutting-

edge research papers, encourage publications in various outlets, and stimulate collaborative research projects.

Although the conference is open to the public and there is no cost of admission, as seating is limited we do request that you register in advance by contacting the Chair of Ukrainian Studies by e-mail ([chairukr@gmail.com](mailto:chairukr@gmail.com)) or by phone (613-562-5800 ext. 3692).

The 2008 Danyliw Seminar is made possible by the commitment of the Wolodymyr George Danyliw Foundation to the pursuit of excellence in the study of contemporary Ukraine. We hope that you will join us for what promises to be a stimulating and exciting gathering.

For a PDF version of the 2008 Danyliw Seminar Program, go to [http://www.ukrainianstudies.uottawa.ca/pdf/Danyliw08\\_program.pdf](http://www.ukrainianstudies.uottawa.ca/pdf/Danyliw08_program.pdf).

Fourth Annual Danyliw Research Seminar on Contemporary Ukraine

Chair of Ukrainian Studies  
University of Ottawa  
23-25 October 2008  
The Lounge, New Residence, 90 University Private

Program

Thursday 23 October

75TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE UKRAINIAN HOLODOMOR

Session 1, 1.30-3.30 PM  
Recognizing and Debating the Holodomor

Maja Catic (Brandeis U, US, [mcatic@brandeis.edu](mailto:mcatic@brandeis.edu))  
Moral Claims and Political Demands:  
The Politics of Genocide Recognition in Bosnia and Ukraine  
Discussant: Charles King (Georgetown U, US, [kingch@georgetown.edu](mailto:kingch@georgetown.edu))

Myroslava Antonovych (U Kyïv Mohyla Academy, Ukraine, [mma@iatp.kiev.ua](mailto:mma@iatp.kiev.ua))  
Legal Accountability for the Crime of the 1932-1933 Great Famine in Ukraine  
Discussant: Dominique Arel (Chair of Ukrainian Studies, U of Ottawa, Canada, [darel@uottawa.ca](mailto:darel@uottawa.ca))

Session II, 4-6 PM  
Memory and History

Ivan Katchanovski (SUNY Potsdam, US, [ivan.katchanovski@utoronto.ca](mailto:ivan.katchanovski@utoronto.ca))  
The Politics of Soviet and Nazi Genocides against Ukrainians in Orange Ukraine

Discussant: Wsewolod Isajiw (U of Toronto, Canada, [isajiw@hotmail.com](mailto:isajiw@hotmail.com))

Omer Bartov (Brown U, US, [omer.bartov@gmail.com](mailto:omer.bartov@gmail.com))

Memory, Erasure, and Commemoration in Contemporary Western Ukraine

Discussant: Dominique Arel (Chair of Ukrainian Studies, U of Ottawa, Canada, [darel@uottawa.ca](mailto:darel@uottawa.ca))

Opening Reception, 6.15-7.15 PM

Friday 24 October

## CONTESTED MEMORY OF WORLD WAR II VIOLENCE IN UKRAINE

Session III, 9-11 AM

Commemorating, Insurgency and Deportations

Sofia Dyak (Center for Urban History of East Central Europe in Lviv, Ukraine, [sofia.dyak@gmail.com](mailto:sofia.dyak@gmail.com))

In a Place of Displacement: Commemorating Deportations in Lviv after 1991

Discussant: Jan Grabowski (U of Ottawa, Canada, [jgrabows@uottawa.ca](mailto:jgrabows@uottawa.ca))

Olesya Khromeychuk (U College London, UK, [olesya\\_khromeychuk@yahoo.co.uk](mailto:olesya_khromeychuk@yahoo.co.uk))

A Micro-Historical Approach to the Waffen SS “Galicia” Division’s Journey from Austria to Britain, 1945-1950

Discussant: Orest Subtelny (York U, Canada, [subtelny@yorku.ca](mailto:subtelny@yorku.ca))

Session IV, 11.30 AM-1.30 PM

The OUN and World War II Violence

Marco Carynnyk (Writer, Toronto, Canada, [mcarynnyk7882@rogers.com](mailto:mcarynnyk7882@rogers.com))

The 1941 Pogroms in Lviv, Zolochiv, and Ternopil

Discussant: Leonid Heretz (Bridgewater Community College, US, [heretz@bellatlantic.net](mailto:heretz@bellatlantic.net))

Sofia Grachova (Harvard U, US, [sofia\\_grachova@yahoo.com](mailto:sofia_grachova@yahoo.com))

Unknown Victims: Ethnic-Based Violence of the World War II Era in Ukrainian Politics of Memory after 2004

Discussant: John-Paul Himka (U of Alberta, Canada, [john-paul.himka@ualberta.ca](mailto:john-paul.himka@ualberta.ca))

## THE CHOICE OF UKRAINE

Session V, 3-5.30 PM

The War in Georgia and Its Implications for Ukraine’s Security

Adrian Karatnycky (Orange Circle, US, [fhpres@aol.com](mailto:fhpres@aol.com))

Ukraine and NATO on the Eve of the December 2008 Summit

Charles King (Georgetown U, US, [kingch@georgetown.edu](mailto:kingch@georgetown.edu))  
The “Unfreezing” Conflicts in Transnistria and Crimea

John Jaworsky (U of Waterloo, Canada, [jjaworsk@watarts.uwaterloo.ca](mailto:jjaworsk@watarts.uwaterloo.ca))  
Foreseeable Scenarios for Crimea, Sevastopol, and the Black Sea Fleet

Saturday 25 October

## SOCIETY, ECONOMICS, AND POLITICS IN POST-ORANGE UKRAINE

Session VII, 9 AM-12 PM  
Social and Economic Challenges

Mihai Varga (U of Amsterdam, The Netherlands)  
How Can Trade Union Effectively Represent Workers in Post-Soviet Ukraine? The Case of  
Plant-Level Unions in Civil Machine-Building  
Discussant: Serge Denis (U of Ottawa, Canada, [sdenis@uottawa.ca](mailto:sdenis@uottawa.ca))

Maureen Murney (U of Toronto, Canada, [m.murney@utoronto.ca](mailto:m.murney@utoronto.ca))  
The Politics of Gender, Alcohol Consumption, and Addiction in Western Ukraine  
Discussant: Margaret Paxson (Kennan Institute, Washington, DC,  
[Margaret.Paxson@wilsoncenter.org](mailto:Margaret.Paxson@wilsoncenter.org))

Natalia Khanenko-Friesen (U of Saskatchewan, Canada, [natalia.khanenkofriesen@gmail.com](mailto:natalia.khanenkofriesen@gmail.com))  
Oral History of De-collectivization in Ukraine in the 1990s:  
Rural Experiences and Perspectives  
Discussant: Jessica Allina-Pisano (U of Ottawa, Canada, [jallinap@uottawa.ca](mailto:jallinap@uottawa.ca))

Session VIII, 2-5 PM  
Elite and Mass Politics

Adam Swain (U of Nottingham, UK, [Adam.Swain@nottingham.ac.uk](mailto:Adam.Swain@nottingham.ac.uk))  
Performing Corruption in Ukraine  
Discussants: Vitaliy Voznyak (U of Illinois at Chicago, US, [vvozny2@uic.edu](mailto:vvozny2@uic.edu))  
Joshua Tucker (NYU, US, [joshua.tucker@nyu.edu](mailto:joshua.tucker@nyu.edu))

Lucan Way (U of Toronto, Canada, [lway@utsc.utoronto.ca](mailto:lway@utsc.utoronto.ca))  
Deer in Headlights: Nomenklatura Organizational Culture and Political Competition in the  
Former Soviet Union  
Discussant: Oxana Shevel (Tufts U, US, [oxana.shevel@tufts.edu](mailto:oxana.shevel@tufts.edu))

Joshua Tucker (NYU, US, [joshua.tucker@nyu.edu](mailto:joshua.tucker@nyu.edu))  
People Power or a One-Shot Deal? The Legacy of the Colored Revolutions  
Considered from a Collective Action Framework  
Discussant: Lucan Way (U of Toronto, Canada, [lway@utsc.utoronto.ca](mailto:lway@utsc.utoronto.ca))

#2

The Great Famine in Ukraine:  
The Holodomor and Its Consequences, 1933 to the Present

Conference sponsored by the  
Ukrainian Research Institute  
Harvard University

17–18 November 2008

Harvard University  
Harvard Faculty Club  
Library  
20 Quincy Street  
Cambridge, MA 02138  
Monday, November 17, 2008  
9:00 a.m.–12:00 noon

Opening

Michael S. Flier  
Director, Ukrainian Research Institute, Harvard University  
Welcome and Opening Remarks

Andrea Graziosi  
Professor of History, University of Naples "Federico II"  
"And Then What Happened? Conceptualizing a New Agenda for Holodomor and Post-Famine Studies"

Session 1. Holodomor: The Dynamics of the Tragedy

Chair:  
George G. Grabowicz  
Dmytro Čyzevs'kyj Professor of Ukrainian Literature, Harvard University

Papers:  
Liudmyla Hrynevych  
Senior Research Fellow, Institute of History of Ukraine, National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine  
"The Holodomor in Time and Place: A Chronology"

Hennadii Yefimenko  
Senior Research Fellow, Institute of History of Ukraine, National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine  
"The Great Famine and the Nationalities Question"

Brian Boeck  
Assistant Professor of History, DePaul University  
“Complicating the National Interpretation of the Famine: Reexamining the Case of Kuban”

Discussant:  
Nicolas Werth  
Research Director, National Center for Scientific Research, Paris

Open Discussion  
Monday, November 17, 2008  
1:30–3:45 p.m.

Session 2. The Short-Term Consequences of the Holodomor: From  
Famine to War (1933–1939)

Chair:  
Terry Martin  
George F. Baker III Professor of Russian Studies, Harvard University

Papers:  
Yuri Shapoval  
Head of Department of Ethnopolitics, Kuras Institute of Political and Ethnic Studies,  
National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine  
"The Great Famine and Its Link with Repression in Ukraine in 1933-34"

Stanislav Kulchytskyi  
Deputy Director, Institute of History of Ukraine, National Academy of Sciences of  
Ukraine  
"The Ukrainian Village after the Holodomor"

Hiroaki Kuromiya  
Professor of History, Indiana University  
"The Impact of the Famine on the City in Ukraine"

Alexander Babyonyshev (Maksudov)  
Center Associate, Davis Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies, Harvard University  
"Dehumanization: Changes in Moral-Ethical Consciousness in the Wake of the Famine"

Discussant:  
Oleg Khlevniuk  
Senior Research Fellow, State Archive of the Russian Federation, Moscow

Open Discussion  
Monday, November 17, 2008  
4:00–6:00 p.m.

Session 3. The Mid-Term Aftermath of the Famine: The World War II  
Period

Chair:

Mark Kramer

Director, Cold War Studies Program, Harvard University

Papers:

Roman Wysocki

Assistant Professor, Institute of History, Maria Curie-Skłodowska University, Lublin

"Reactions to the Famine in Poland and Its West Ukrainian Regions"

Karel Berkhoff

Researcher and Associate Professor, Center for Holocaust and Genocide Studies,  
Amsterdam

"The Great Famine in Light of the German Invasion and Occupation"

Oleksandra Veselova

Senior Research Fellow, Institute of History of Ukraine, National Academy of Sciences of  
Ukraine

"The Soviet Return and the Famine of 1946–47: Complicating the Holodomor in  
Retrospect"

Discussant:

Roman Serbyn

Professor of History (Emeritus), University of Quebec at Montreal

Open Discussion

8:00 p.m.

CONCERT

Premiere Performance of Selections from the Opera Red Earth (Hunger) by Virko Baley  
(with commentary by the composer)

Tuesday, November 18, 2008

9:00–11:30 p.m.

Session 4. Long-Term Consequences: Population Losses and  
Demographic Impact

Chair:

Lubomyr Hajda

Associate Director, Ukrainian Research Institute, Harvard University

Papers:

Hennadii Boriak

Head of Department of Historiography and Special Historical Disciplines, Institute of History of Ukraine, National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine

"Population Losses in the Holodomor: New Archival Evidence"

France Meslé

Research Director, National Institute of Demographic Studies, Paris

Jacques Vallin

Research Director, National Institute of Demographic Studies, Paris

"The Long-Term Demographic Impact of the Holodomor: The Statistical Evidence"

Discussants:

Oleh Wolowyna

President, Informed Decisions, Inc.

Open Discussion

Tuesday, November 18, 2008

1:30–3:45 p.m.

Session 5. Long-Term Consequences: Society and Politics

Chair:

Roman Szporluk

Mykhailo Hrushevsky Professor of Ukrainian History (Emeritus), Harvard University

Papers:

Valerii Vasylyev

Senior Research Fellow, Institute of History of Ukraine, National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine

"The Great Famine in the Eyes of the Soviet Ukrainian Elite (1950s–1970s)"

Heorhii Kasianov

Head of Department of Contemporary History and Politics, Institute of History of Ukraine, National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine

"The Holodomor and the Politics of Memory since the 1980s"

Volodymyr Dibrova

Writer-in-Residence and Editor, Ukrainian Research Institute

Preceptor, Department of Slavic Languages and Literatures, Harvard University

"Literary Reflections and Refractions: The Holodomor and the Contemporary Ukrainian Writer"

Discussant:

George G. Grabowicz  
Dmytro Čyzevs'kyj Professor of Ukrainian Literature, Harvard University

Open Discussion

Tuesday, November 18, 2008  
4:00–6:00 p.m.

Session 6. Roundtable Discussion

Chair:  
Serhii Plokhii  
Mykhailo Hrushevsky Professor of Ukrainian History, Harvard University

Speakers:  
Andrea Graziosi  
Professor of History, University of Naples "Federico II"

Lubomyr Hajda  
Associate Director, Ukrainian Research Institute, Harvard University

Stanislav Kulchytskyi  
Deputy Director, Institute of History of Ukraine, National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine

Timothy Snyder  
Professor of History, Yale University

Roman Szporluk  
Mykhailo Hrushevsky Professor of Ukrainian History (Emeritus), Harvard University

Felix Wemheuer  
Visiting Scholar, Fairbank Center for Chinese Studies, Harvard University

Open Discussion

8:00 p.m.

Keynote Address  
Nicolas Werth  
Research Director, National Center for Scientific Research, Paris

Concluding Remarks  
Andrea Graziosi  
Professor of History, University of Naples "Federico II"

Michael S. Flier

Director, Ukrainian Research Institute, Harvard University

For more information and updates, see HURI website  
<[www.huri.harvard.edu](http://www.huri.harvard.edu)>

To ease the registration process at the door, attendees are requested to pre-register on-line.

Contact information:

Ukrainian Research Institute  
Harvard University  
Address: 34 Kirkland Street, Cambridge, MA 02138  
Hours of operation: 9a.m.-5p.m. EST  
Phone: 617-495-4053  
Fax: 617-495-8097  
E-mail: [huri@fas.harvard.edu](mailto:huri@fas.harvard.edu)

#3

Call for Papers

“Imagined Communities, Real Conflicts, and National Identities”

14th Annual World Convention of the Association for the Study of Nationalities (ASN)

International Affairs Building,  
Columbia University, NY  
Sponsored by the Harriman Institute  
23-25 April 2009  
[www.nationalities.org](http://www.nationalities.org)

\*\*\*Proposal deadline: 5 November 2008\*\*\*

Contact information:  
proposals must be submitted to:  
[darel@uottawa.ca](mailto:darel@uottawa.ca) and [darelasn2009@gmail.com](mailto:darelasn2009@gmail.com)

100+ PANELS on the Balkans, Central Europe and the Baltics, Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, Central Asia and Eurasia, the Caucasus, Turkey, Afghanistan, China and surrounding territories

SPECIAL SECTIONS on  
Theoretical Approaches to Nationalism and Empire  
The Independence of Kosovo and Its Implications  
The War in Georgia and Its Implications

THEMATIC Panels on

Islam and Politics, Genocide and Ethnic Violence, Anthropology of Identity, Citizenship and Nationality, Religion, Language Politics, Conflict Resolution, Autonomy, Gender, EU Integration, NATO Expansion, Diaspora Politics, International Law, and many more...

AWARDS for Best Doctoral Student Papers

SCREENING of Recent Films and Documentaries

The ASN Convention, the most attended international and inter-disciplinary scholarly gathering of its kind, welcomes proposals on a wide range of topics related to national identity, nationalism, ethnic conflict, state-building and the study of empires in Central/Eastern Europe, the former Soviet Union, the Balkans, Eurasia, and adjacent areas. Disciplines represented include political science, history, anthropology, sociology, international studies, security studies, economics, geography and geopolitics, sociolinguistics, psychology, and related fields.

The Convention also features a section devoted to theoretical approaches to nationalism, from any of the disciplines listed above. The papers in this section need not be grounded in an area of the former Communist bloc usually covered by ASN, provided that the issues examined are relevant to a truly comparative understanding of nationalism-related issues. In this vein, we are welcoming theory-focused and comparative proposals, rather than specific case studies from outside Central/Eastern Europe and Eurasia. A dozen panels are normally featured in the Nationalism section.

In the wake of the dramatic events that have unfolded in late summer 2008, the Convention will also present a special section on "The War in Georgia and its Implications." The Convention is inviting paper, panel, roundtable, or special presentation proposals on various aspects of the conflict, as it relates to Georgia, the South Caucasus, the North Caucasus, Ukraine, the "frozen" conflicts, Russian nationalism, Russophone minorities in the "near abroad", domestic politics, the Fate of the "Coloured" Revolutions, NATO enlargement, US-Europe-Russia relations, the European Union and related topics. A special section will also be devoted to "The Independence of Kosovo and its Implications," with emphasis on Balkans post-war reconstruction, international law, self-determination, ethnic conflicts, minority rights, regional security and so forth.

Since 2005, the ASN Convention has acknowledged excellence in graduate studies research by offering Awards for Best Doctoral Student Papers in five sections: Russia/Ukraine/Caucasus, Central Asia/Eurasia, Central Europe, Balkans, and Nationalism Studies. The winners at the 2008 Convention were Jesse Driscoll (Stanford U, Political Science) for Russia/Ukraine/Caucasus, Sarah Cameron (History, Yale U) and Kristin Fabbe (Political Science, MIT, US) for Central Asia/Eurasia/Turkey, Helena Toth (Harvard U, History) for Central Europe, Valentina Burrai (UC London, UK, Political Science) for the Balkans, and Lee Seymour (Northwestern U, Political Science) for Nationalism Studies. Doctoral student applicants whose proposals are accepted for the 2009 Convention, who have not defended their dissertation by 1 November 2008, and whose papers are delivered by the deadline, will automatically be considered for the awards.

The 2009 Convention is also inviting submissions for documentaries or feature films made within the past few years and available in DVD format (either NTSC or PAL). Most films selected for the convention will be screened during regular panel slots and will be followed by a discussion moderated by an academic expert. Films on the 2008 Program included Milosevic On Trial (Denmark, 2007), Nanking (US, 2007), Around Mostar, the Bridge and Bruce Lee (Italy, 2007), Yippee (US, 2007) and The More You Speak, The More You Cry (Greece, 2007).

The 2009 Convention invites proposals for INDIVIDUAL PAPERS or PANELS. A panel includes a chair, three presentations based on written papers, and a discussant. Proposals using an innovative format are encouraged. Examples of new formats include a roundtable on a new book, in which the author is being engaged by three discussants (twelve book panels were featured in the 2008 Convention); a debate between two panelists over a critical research or policy question, following rules of public debating; or special presentations based on original papers where the number of discussants is equal to or greater than the number of presenters.

The 2008 Convention is also welcoming offers to serve as DISCUSSANT on a panel to be created by the program committee from individual paper proposals. The application to be considered as discussant can be self-standing, or accompanied by an individual paper proposal.

There is NO APPLICATION FORM to fill out in order to send proposals to the convention, BUT A FACT SHEET IS REQUIRED; TO BE DOWNLOADED AT [www.nationalities.org](http://www.nationalities.org). All proposals and fact sheets must be sent by email to Dominique Arel at both [darel@uottawa.ca](mailto:darel@uottawa.ca) and [darelasn2009@gmail.com](mailto:darelasn2009@gmail.com).

INDIVIDUAL PAPER PROPOSALS must include the name, email and affiliation of the author, a postal address for paper mail, the title of the paper, a 500-word abstract and a 100-word biographical statement that includes full references of your last or forthcoming publication, if applicable. Long CVs will be rejected, as the bio statement must be sent in narrative form, like a long paragraph. Graduate students must indicate the title of their dissertation and year of projected defense. They can also submit bibliographic information of a recent or forthcoming publication.

PANEL PROPOSALS must include the title of the panel, a chair, three paper-givers with the title of their papers, and a discussant; the name, affiliation, email, postal address and 100-word biographical statements of each participant and include full references of their last or forthcoming publication, if applicable. Graduate students must indicate the title of their dissertation, the year they join a doctoral program and year of projected defense. A 500-word abstract of each paper is not required for panel proposals.

PROPOSALS FOR FILMS OR VIDEOS must include the name, email and affiliation of the author, a postal address for hard (paper mail), the title of the film, name of director, country and year of production, a 500-word abstract of the theme of the film and a 100-word biographical statement.

PROPOSALS USING AN INNOVATIVE FORMAT must include the title of the panel, the names, emails, affiliations, postal addresses, 100-word biographical statements of each

participant (same specifications as above) and a discussion on the proposed format.

INDIVIDUAL PROPOSALS TO SERVE AS DISCUSSANT must include the name, email, affiliation, postal address, a paragraph about the areas of expertise of the proposed discussant, and a 100-word biographical statement (same specifications as above).

All proposals must be included IN THE BODY OF A SINGLE EMAIL, except for the FACT SHEET that must be attached. Attachments other than the Fact Sheet will be accepted only if they repeat the content of the email message/proposal, and if all the information is contained IN A SINGLE ATTACHMENT. The reception of all proposals will be acknowledged electronically (with some delay during deadline week, due to the high volume of proposals).

Participants are responsible for covering all travel and accommodation costs. Unfortunately, ASN has no funding available for panelists.

An international Program Committee will be entrusted with the selection of proposals. Applicants will be notified in December 2008 or January 2009. Information regarding registration costs and other logistical questions will be communicated afterwards.

The full list of panels from last year's convention can be accessed at [http://www.nationalities.org/convention/pdfs/ASN\\_2008\\_final\\_program.pdf](http://www.nationalities.org/convention/pdfs/ASN_2008_final_program.pdf)

The film lineup of last year's convention can be accessed at <http://www.nationalities.org/convention/films.asp>

The programs from past conventions, going back to 2001, are also online at <http://www.nationalities.org/convention/past.asp>

Several dozen publishers and companies have had exhibits and/or advertised in the Convention Program in past years. Due to considerations of space, advertisers and exhibitors are encouraged to place their order early. For information, please contact Convention Executive Director Gordon N. Bardos ([gnb12@columbia.edu](mailto:gnb12@columbia.edu)).

We look forward to receiving your proposal!

The Convention organizing committee:  
Dominique Arel, ASN President  
Gordon N. Bardos, Executive Director  
David Crowe, ASN Chair of Advisory Board  
Sherrill Stroschein, Program Chair

Deadline for proposals: 5 November 2008 (to be sent to both [darel@uottawa.ca](mailto:darel@uottawa.ca) AND [darelasn2009@gmail.com](mailto:darelasn2009@gmail.com))

The ASN convention's headquarters are located at the:

Harriman Institute  
Columbia University  
1216 IAB  
420 W. 118th St.  
New York, NY 10027  
212 854 8487 tel  
212 666 3481 fax  
[gmb12@columbia.edu](mailto:gmb12@columbia.edu)

#4

#### Yushchenko Dissolves Parliament, Announces Pre-Term Elections

Ukrains'ka pravda, 8 October 2008

[translated by Vitaliy Voznyak for UKL]

Dear Ukrainian people,  
Dear compatriots,

I will speak in a simple and open way.

On September 2, 2008, a new coalition was formed, de facto, in the Ukrainian parliament (Rada) comprising the Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc (BYuT), the Party of Regions, and the Communist Party.

This coalition worked tirelessly for thirty days. It formed parliamentary leadership, created the daily agenda of the Ukrainian parliament, and adopted quite a few pieces of legislation, a significant portion of which were unconstitutional, and in my opinion not Ukrainian and not democratic, which in turn forced me to veto some of these laws.

The events of September 2 and those decisions which were adopted by the parliament, undeniably, have made the existence of a democratic coalition impossible. And, on September 3, the de jure break-up of the coalition was announced.

This is a fact. Of course, the facts on the ground are more complicated.

We need to return many-many times to September 2, 2008 and give a comprehensive answer of what happened. We need to do this so that every person understands what was taking place in the parliament at the time and behind the backs of the true coalition.

On September 2, in effect, began the dismantling of Ukraine and our values.

The balance of power, national security, the political direction, language, all of this became the target of special interests.

The democratic coalition - I am convinced, deeply convinced - was destroyed with only one

thing – personal ambition. The personal ambition of one individual which was propelled by the thirst for power, and by a preference for personal interests over those of the country.

The coalition's understanding and the coalition's agreements are destroyed; the economic reform is not implemented; the fulfillment of electoral promises has grown into a total social populism, which has caused the largest inflation in Europe and the lowering of social standards of living, as reflected in the salary, pension, and many other social programs.

At the time of potential external threats, what we saw was a resort to anti-Ukrainian scenarios – without a backbone and in essence hostile [to Ukrainian interests –UKL].

We see also another dangerous and brought to us from the outside tendency: an attack to break up the national-democratic forces. This is – a nail, consciously driven into our body.

The Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc itself became hostage to its leadership, because they are ready to sacrifice everything – language, national security, and our European perspective.

I really want to be understood rightly.

The problem is not with the configuration of the political powers.

The problem lies in the decisions which threaten Ukraine.

Herein lies the essence of truth.

The constitution provides thirty days for the coalition formation. Exercising my constitutional prerogative, I extended this period for another five days.

I am ready to accept any lawful coalition and the decisions of its government.

Yet, the picture is obvious. Some who have undermined the democratic coalition are now pretending to be “holy.”

Others claim to be middlemen awaiting some unclear signals. The third group is looking for their own political or personal benefit in the murky waters that have resulted.

As of October 8, 2008, I did not receive not one proposition from any political power regarding the formation of a majority coalition, an agreement which was signed by more than 225 deputies of Ukraine.

Therefore, in a situation when the political parties have ended up at a dead end, the final word must be left for the Ukrainian people.

In accordance with the Constitution of Ukraine, I announce the cessation of the functioning of the Verkhovna Rada of the sixth assembly, and consequently announce pre-term parliamentary elections.

The election will take place democratically and under the rule of law.

They tried to revert us to the past.

Just as a year ago, I stand here now in defense of our future. I call for active engagement of the entire Ukrainian electorate, of all thinking people, of all Ukrainian citizens and of all Ukrainian patriots.

The decision, undeniably is up-to-you. It is up-to-you, this highest in the country responsibility, since after all it is you who elects to power Ukrainian politicians. Consider your decision.

Behind this decision stands the future of Ukraine.

[Note from UKL: Yushchenko's repeated reference to "language" may seem puzzling to UKL readers. On September 22, the Rada adopted, in its first reading, a draft law on civil servants, making mandatory the knowledge of both Ukrainian and Russian. The Party of Regions and the Communists nearly unanimously supported the draft, while virtually no one from Our Ukraine did. Surprisingly, the vast majority of the Tymoshenko Bloc were in favor. Ukraina moloda (September 23) wrote, with irony, that the Tymoshenko Bloc "had not noticed" this disposition of the law, i.e. de facto providing an official status to Russian, which contradicted its platform—DA]

#5

December Elections

by Alina Pastukhova

Kyiv Post, 8 October 2008

<http://www.kyivpost.com/nation/30214>

President Victor Yushchenko dissolved the parliament on Oct. 8. A new election is expected in mid-December, as the Constitution allows 60 days for preparation from the date the president's dissolution decree is published.

[Yushchenko announced today that the election will be on December 7 – UKL]

"In this state of affairs, when parliamentary forces have cornered themselves, the Ukrainian people have to have their say," Yushchenko said in a televised address to the nation.

He said he decided to dismiss the Verkhovna Rada because, after the breakup of the ruling coalition on Sept. 3, the parliament was making decisions that were "ruining Ukraine."

"The democratic coalition – I am sure of it – was ruined by the ambitions of a single person," he said.

Under Ukraine's Constitution, the president has the right, but no obligation, to call for an early

election if parliament fails to form a coalition in 30 days. The deadline ran out on Oct. 3, and Ukrainians are expected to go to the polls for the third time in as many years.

A snap election is actually disadvantageous for the pro-presidential Our Ukraine-People's Self-Defense bloc that would only gain 9.4 percent of votes, down from last year's 14.5 percent, according to a recent poll by the National Institute for Strategic Studies. The situation will be even worse if Self-Defense runs independently, like its members said they would.

Analysts said the only potential gain for the president would be the removal of Yulia Tymoshenko, his former ally, from the prime minister's job – and thus from the limelight, hoping to curb her growing popularity. “Yushchenko is afraid of Tymoshenko as a serious competitor in the presidential elections,” said Oles Doniy, a member of Yushchenko's bloc.

The president's strategy is to install a premier who does not want to run for president after the new parliament is elected, said Volodymyr Fesenko, a political analyst.

Yushchenko and Tymoshenko have an ongoing personal conflict that has resulted in the collapse of the coalition of their political forces, as well as public attacks and accusations. Yushchenko accused Tymoshenko of treason in September, while she said this week that he has been evading her phone calls, even from the so-called “hotline.” She also sneered at a nasty joke by Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin that Yushchenko acted like “a pickpocket” when he flew a plane reserved for Tymoshenko.

Tymoshenko teamed up with the oppositional Party of Regions and Communists in September to pass laws curbing presidential powers and simplifying the impeachment process. She backtracked this week by supporting Yushchenko's vetoes of some of the laws. However the president is afraid the premier might change her mind again, according to experts.

“Yushchenko doesn't trust Tymoshenko and is afraid that [her bloc] BYuT will vote again for laws reducing his power,” said Fesenko. He said snap elections will guarantee that this law won't be restored – at least for a while.

A snap election would most likely take place in December, on the Sunday following 60 days from parliament's official dissolution. The front-runner, Party of Regions, would receive 22.3 percent of votes, Tymoshenko's BYuT – 18.1 percent, Volodymyr Lytvyn Bloc – 7.1 percent and some 6.1 percent would support the Communists, according to a poll conducted on Sept. 25-28 by the National Institute for Strategic Studies.

#6

**New Publication on Contemporary Ukraine: Ukraine Analyst**

Ukraine Analyst is a new bimonthly 8-page publication launched in September 2008 to fill a niche in the supply of timely analysis on contemporary Ukraine. Ukraine Analyst is the only English-language publication to cover current Ukrainian affairs on a systematic basis.

Ukraine Analyst covers politics, international affairs, economics, business and energy in an

depth and lucid manner. The first two issues included extensive analysis on the unfolding political crisis in Ukraine, comments by Western experts on Ukraine's crisis, the impact of the Georgian crisis on Ukrainian domestic politics, shedding greater understanding on the president's strategy and game-plan and outlining different possible scenarios.

Articles for consideration in *Ukraine Analyst* and questions about subscriptions can be addressed to the editor, Taras Kuzio at [editor\\_ukraineanalyst@kuzioassociates.com](mailto:editor_ukraineanalyst@kuzioassociates.com)

The first two issues of *Ukraine Analyst* can be downloaded from [www.taraskuzio.net](http://www.taraskuzio.net)

#7

### Western Experts on Ukraine's Crisis

*Ukraine Analyst*, No. 2

Vol.1, No. 2 (30 September 2008)

Edited by Taras Kuzio

[www.taraskuzio.net](http://www.taraskuzio.net)

Dominique Arel  
Chair of Ukrainian Studies  
University of Ottawa

The latest political crisis in Ukraine reveals, or accentuates, two significant developments. The first is the incapacity by political actors to agree on a durable institutional arrangement to share power. The duality of executive power, between a presidential administration and a Cabinet of Ministers, has repeatedly led to accusations by the Prime Minister, whether Tymoshenko (2005, 2008) or Yanukovich (2007), that his/her powers are being encroached upon by the presidential office. Once the Prime Minister could no longer be ousted by the President, as of 2006, the office of the Prime Minister — then under Yanukovich (2007), now under Tymoshenko (2008) — has tried to unilaterally emasculate presidential executive power. Yushchenko may be a weak president, with admittedly a low standing in the polls, but we ought to distinguish between the politician and the institution. I don't think that the Presidency, as an institution, and one, after all, that has driven the Orange Revolution, has less popular trust than the office of the Prime Minister. It could be very well that a parliamentary system is better in the long run for Ukraine than a mixed presidential-parliamentary — although I remain skeptical, since the basic issue is one of contempt for the rule of law by all political actors — but obtaining this result through a sudden and temporary marriage of convenience between two political opponents in order to get rid of a third one is regressive for the point of view of democratic state-building. In 2007, the Tymoshenko Bloc sided with the Yushchenko forces to prevent the Party of Regions from achieving, through bribes and all, a constitutional majority and thereby rewrite the rules of the game with impunity. Tymoshenko has now sided by Yanukovich to do exactly that.

The second development, wholly unexpected to me, is a reorientation of Tymoshenko, and of her rather obedient political bloc, on the all-important Russia question. Electoral cleavages since 1994, and particularly since the Orange Revolution, have been greatly determined by views towards Ukraine-Russia relations and the status of the Russian language in Ukraine and they split

Ukraine regionally. The evidence, on that score, is fairly convincing. Tymoshenko, in 2007, still got her overwhelming support in Central and Western Ukraine — like Our Ukraine. On Georgia, however, Tymoshenko essentially took a position — virtually hidden from view — far more sympathetic to Russia than the official EU position. Her parliamentary leader in the Rada said in so many words that the war in Georgia “is foreign to us.” Well, Europe, for all its internal divisions, certainly felt concerned. While remaining agnostic on who started the war, it did explicitly condemn the “disproportionate” military response by Russia and found “unacceptable” its de facto occupation of parts of “Georgia proper.” Tymoshenko, meanwhile, has no official opinion on the matter, other than a respect for territorial integrity (unlike the Party of Regions). Now, it is one thing to be extremely cautious, if not opposed, to the political wisdom of campaigning for Ukraine to join NATO, and the latest polls continue to show strong opposition on this score, even in the “Orange” electoral zone. But I can’t believe that Central and Western Ukraine, and perhaps even a solid base of Eastern Ukrainians, feel indifferent or “neutral” vis-à-vis recent Russian actions in Georgia (irrespective of who is to blame for having triggered the violence). Were Ukraine to experience into yet another bout of parliamentary elections, it is hard to imagine that the Tymoshenko Bloc would not pay an electoral price for her complete turnaround on the Russian question. All the analysis is fixated on the electoral failure of Our Ukraine, but the political transformation of Tymoshenko is puzzling to me.

Henry Hale, George Washington University

What we are seeing in Ukraine today is classic wedge politics. With strong western Ukrainian support in her pocket, Tymoshenko has been ambitiously trying to broaden her base of support to eastern and southern regions by downplaying nationalist rhetoric and playing up her social and economic policies. Analysts have long speculated that Yushchenko's team, eclipsed by Tymoshenko in the polls, would try to find some big new way to discredit her as the 2010 presidential elections approached. The Georgia-Russia crisis provided an opportunity when Tymoshenko laid low, refusing to unconditionally back Saakashvili or threaten action against Russia's Black Sea Fleet. Yushchenko, in contrast, did both of those things and portrayed Tymoshenko's low-key response as evidence of her having struck a deal with Russia. By polarizing Ukrainian politics on this issue, the President and Baloha are trying to drive a wedge between Tymoshenko and her Western base of supporters, which Yushchenko then hopes to recapture for himself. Thus far, polls show little evidence that the wedge strategy is working, and the political spectacle it has generated has further eroded Ukraine's image in the world. Since crisis politics has strong domestic roots in identity and institutions, it will most likely continue in Ukraine until institutions are changed or until voters get a chance to decide in the next parliamentary and/or presidential elections--regardless of what the international community does.

Lucan Way, University of Toronto

What is most striking about the most recent version of “Ukraine in Crisis” is the continuity with the Leonid Kravchuk and Leonid Kuchma eras. The country has become more democratic than it was before but continues to lunge almost constantly from one political crisis to another. First and most striking is the fact that the each President, fearing future political challenges from the Prime Minister, has focused on ensuring that the government fails. Just as Kuchma fired the relatively competent Prime Minister Yevhen Marchuk in 1996 and Victor Yushchenko in 2001 for fear that

each would challenge him in the 1999 and 2004 Presidential elections, President Yushchenko has done nearly everything to undermine Tymoshenko for fear that she will beat Yushchenko in 2010. Next, just as in the Kravchuk and Kuchma eras, parliament is characterized by bewildering fluidity. The “swamp” of the 1990s has been replaced by a de facto (more or less) three party system in which each side is ready to make alliances with the other with little regard to political ideology.

There are three main causes to this situation of near constant crisis. The first is that—in part because of the country’s strong regional divisions—no political group is able to monopolize political control. Thus, political coalitions are rarely defeated in any long term way. Second, ideology plays a relatively weak role in shaping political alliances. In the mid 1990s, Kuchma was seen as the reformist President against a Communist legislature. Yet, subsequent revelations showed Kuchma to be much more interested in accumulating power for its own sake than in bringing market reform to Ukraine. Similarly, the orange revolution was initially heralded as the victory of Westernizing forces against a pro-Russian kleptocracy. The orange revolution indeed led to the creation of democracy in Ukraine—no mean achievement. Yet, Yushchenko in power has shown that he is ready to undermine his own erstwhile allies even when that means aligning with the pro-Russian Yanukovych and slowing efforts to bring Ukraine closer to Europe. Most recently Tymoshenko seems prepared to align with Yanukovych in her battle against her former ally in the orange revolution.

Finally, and most critically, crisis and instability have been promoted by an inability for actors to agree on the rules of political competition. Since the 1990s, each side has focused extraordinary efforts on changing or challenging the rules of the game. The passage of the 1996 constitution was supposed to define a set of rules that would allow stable democracy to develop. Yet, almost immediately Kuchma sought to change the constitution again to increase the power of the presidency; and then in 2002 he changed his mind and sought to reduce the power of the presidency when it looked like Yushchenko might get the top post. Similarly, some (including this author) thought that the agreement made during the orange revolution to reduce the powers of the presidency might represent the “pacted transition” that some scholars think is key to democratic stability. Yet, like the 1996 constitution, this reform failed to prevent the different parties from either ignoring the rules of the game or focusing their efforts on changing them. Most notably, then-prime minister Yanukovich in early 2007 ignored rules of imperative mandate that forbade deputies from changing parties by buying off significant numbers of opposition parliamentarians in an effort to increase his majority. President Yushchenko responded by shutting down parliament on dubious constitutional grounds and then fired three judges from the constitutional court in order to prevent it from ruling against his decision.

This situation of chronic instability and discord has obviously reduced the prospects of European integration in the short and medium term. But the best thing western actors can do is not to promote the guys we like over those who support policies that may seem counter to European integration. Our experiences in Russia in the 1990s, and Georgia and Pakistan more recently have demonstrated the dangers of personalizing foreign policy. Instead, we need to pressure all sides to abide by the rules of the game—even if that hurts “our” side in the short term. The

victory of stable and democratic rules of the game is ultimately much more important than the triumph of a particular set of policies.

Steven Pifer, Visiting Fellow, Brookings Institution, Washington DC

At their Bucharest summit meeting in April, NATO leaders instructed foreign ministers to review Ukraine's readiness for a membership action plan (MAP) at their December ministerial. Concern about the Russian reaction will affect the view of some NATO ministers in December, but the political situation within Ukraine also will have a big impact. Ukraine faces three political scenarios: (1) a reconstituted Orange coalition, perhaps with the participation of the Lytvyn Bloc; (2) a BYuT-Regions coalition; or (3) pre-term Rada elections. None of these scenarios bodes well for Ukraine's MAP request. A key question for NATO ministers will be whether the prime minister supports President Yushchenko's desire for a MAP. In scenario 3, Ukraine would be in the run-up to pre-term elections when the NATO ministerial is held, so no one would know with confidence who the next prime minister will be. Scenario 2 likely would result in the prime minister not pushing for MAP. Scenario 1 is the most favorable possibility for a MAP, but that coalition would be seen as far more tenuous than the Yushchenko-Tymoshenko alignment in April, when political uncertainty in Ukraine was a major reason why some NATO members argued that Ukraine was not ready. So Ukraine's MAP prospects in December are dim.

#8

Third Time the Charm?

by Ivan Lozowy

The Ukraine Insider, Vol. 8, No. 3, 23 September 2008

The collapse of the Yushchenko-Tymoshenko coalition which became official on September 16 is the culmination of nine months of intense work by Yushchenko's chief-of-staff, Viktor Baloha. Ever since Tymoshenko was named Prime Minister last December, Baloha has gone to great lengths to undercut her. Every action of Tymoshenko's was countermanded or undermined by Yushchenko and publicly criticized by Baloha or his subordinates in the Presidential Secretariat.

This process has been helped along by Tymoshenko's own charismatic chaotic and devil-may-care approach. But the bottom line has been what is, in the view of Yushchenko's team, the need to rein in Tymoshenko. Because of his own detachment and passivity, Yushchenko's popularity has remained in the single digits whereas presidential elections are only a year away. There was no secret as to what Tymoshenko would do once she became Prime Minister a second time. She would do what she did before, in 2005, namely, privatize and attempt to redistribute former state property through re-privatization efforts while handing out government money in populist measures aimed at increasing her poll ratings.

Accustomed in the 1990's to running the large quasi-state energy holding United Energy Systems of Ukraine, Tymoshenko has reached new heights as Prime Minister. Now she controls a budget of hundreds of billions of hryvnia, all geared to increase her own popularity.

It was this process that Baloha's persistent and quite successful countermeasures were designed

to disrupt. Thus it was only natural that, until this summer, the bitterest conflict between Tymoshenko and Yushchenko was over the State Property Fund. Last spring, Tymoshenko used her usual heavy-handed tactics to try and install her associate, the MP Andriy Portnov, as the head of the State Property Fund. This initiative backfired when Baloha called in the heavy guns, getting the Procuratura to initiate criminal cases against officials helping Portnov.

Despite repeated efforts, Baloha was unable to dislodge Tymoshenko because the parliamentary majority underpinning her government was difficult to manipulate. Apart from Tymoshenko's own block, BYuT, the majority was based on the Our Ukraine coalition with the National Self-Defense organization headed by Minister of Internal Affairs, Yuriy Lutsenko, who is closely allied with Tymoshenko. For its part, Our Ukraine is chaired by Vyacheslav Kyrilenko, who also heads the party's parliamentary faction, who is not very close to Baloha and who has tried to lead an independent line.

Baloha thus created his own party in back in March, Single Center (See *The Ukraine Insider*, vol. 8, no. 2 from May 6, 2008). He also got two of his associates, the MPs Ihor Rybakov and Yuriy But, to leave the Yushchenko-Tymoshenko coalition. But because of parliamentary rules, these moves did not affect the governing coalition.

Following the short-lived Russian-Georgia war in August, however, Baloha seized his chance.

Tymoshenko had famously got on very well with Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili, but she was conspicuously absent in the public sphere when Russian tanks rumbled into Georgia. Baloha's subordinates at first spread rumors then spoke openly of an alleged agreement between Tymoshenko and Russia's Prime Minister Vladimir Putin that she would not criticize Russia over its actions in the Caucasus. The rumors spoke of two additional points on which Tymoshenko had folded in to the Kremlin's demands: she would leave the Russian fleet in Krym's (the Crimea's) Sevastopol alone and would not allow the Odesa-Brody pipeline to pump oil to Europe in detour of Russia. In return, Tymoshenko would receive Russia's blessing and even, possibly, financial support for her presidential bid in 2009. Taking into account the Kremlin's appetites, Tymoshenko's own actions and the confidence with which one of Baloha's direct subordinates has accused Tymoshenko of "treason," this version seems likely

Accusations against Tymoshenko of treason made an impact within the Our Ukraine parliamentary faction, which includes representatives from such patriotically inclined parties as Rukh and the Ukrainian National Party. During a meeting of the Our Ukraine parliamentary faction hastily convened on the night of September 2, for the first time there was a majority against further cooperation with BYuT and the fate of the Yushchenko-Tymoshenko coalition was sealed.

The direct cause of the September 2 meeting was a series of votes cast in the Rada, or parliament, that day in which BYuT voted together with the Party of Regions. This voting constituted an end run by Tymoshenko around Yushchenko, avoiding his obstructionist methods by cooperating with his former rival for the presidency, Viktor Yanukovych, head of the Party of Regions.

Yushchenko and Baloha were aghast. They had just been declared irrelevant in parliament. But, stoking the fires of indignation at Tymoshenko's "betrayal," Baloha was able to achieve the collapse of the Our Ukraine - BYuT coalition. Small wonder then that, as Tymoshenko herself said, immediately after the collapse Baloha and several friends, including the MPs Rybakov and But, left Ukraine on a charter flight to celebrate in a foreign, undisclosed location.

With new elections expected by the end of December, Baloha expects his Single Center party to enter parliament, with him in the role of king-maker. Where is the President in all this? Following docilely along. Rumors of the degree to which Baloha has come to dominate Yushchenko's actions and even thinking have reached legendary proportions. Yushchenko has only helped along such surmises, as when, in response to complaints from some MPs as to Baloha's inordinate influence, Yushchenko responded: "I am Baloha."

#9

### Is Ukraine Ready for Early Elections? Committee of Voters of Ukraine (CVU)

Press Conference, 12 September 2008

[edited for style by UKL]

According to CVU estimations, a political crisis in Ukraine has two real solutions: the creation of a Party of Regions-Yulia Tymoshenko's Bloc or early parliamentary elections. In the first variant, many voters will regard a PR-BYuT coalition as a revision of election results and a perversion of the 2007 popular will. Yulia Tymoshenko's Bloc will inevitably suffer staff and electorate losses in Western and Central regions. Therefore, CVU predicts a high probability of early parliamentary elections and considers such elections as the most honest and fair solution of the present-day situation.

CVU believes that it is possible to solve all contradictions within the limits of the acting Constitution with the help of valid legal mechanisms. CVU calls upon political actors to abstain from the use of power methods, engagement of law-enforcement agencies in political struggle, to abstain from provocations, personal insults, and attempts to usurp the power, organization of impeachment procedure or introduction of direct presidential rule.

In case a decision to hold early elections will be made, it shall be necessary to solve several serious organizational problems through election legislation amendment, the formation of high quality voters' lists, and a change in the composition of the Central Electoral Commission.

CVU emphasizes that it is practically impossible to hold simultaneous parliamentary and presidential elections because of the inconsistency of corresponding laws. Such issues as the principles of the formation of election commissions, the separation of election propaganda for different types of elections, the possibility for a presidential candidate to head a party election list, and so forth, will become problematic.

In case the decision to hold simultaneous parliamentary and presidential elections will be made, it shall be necessary to pass promptly a separate law on their peculiarities, which in its turn will lead to new problems, and a risk of mistakes, down to an electoral breakdown. All these

questions could be solved by passing an Election Code. CVU has been stressing the need to pass such a Code for a long time.

In view of the deepening political crisis in Ukraine and the increasing probability of early parliamentary elections, more and more appeals for raising the threshold [for parties to enter parliament] are made. The CVU emphasizes that the realization of such initiatives is unacceptable for Ukraine and could become a step backwards on the way to democratic development. Under conditions of 'closed' lists of candidates, a higher barrier will undermine the responsibility of deputies before voters even more, transform the parliament into a certain 'closed club' and conserve political elites, which have brought a certain discredit upon themselves.

The process of creating a single state voters register has been stopped almost a year ago because of the unprofessional work of CEC and commercial entities' clashes over the register. Even if the Constitutional Court will unblock the register's formation process in the near future, at least half a year would be needed to form a valuable register. Thus, if early elections are held this winter, they will be held without State voters' register, with all consequent problems. CVU stresses that it is impossible to hold early parliamentary and local elections without corresponding amendments of the Law on State register. Unless these amendments are made the legality of any elections will be questionable.

With the 2008 political crisis, the balance of power was broken in the Central Electoral Commission, which had been formed under a political principle in 2007. The Lytvyn's Bloc is not represented in the CEC, while Socialist Party of Ukraine, who is no longer in parliament, actually is. In one year several CEC members has changed their political affiliation. As a result, the CEC impartiality in decision-making may suffer. The proficiency and competence of the CEC as a collegial body responsible for election process organization give rise to criticism as well. Thus, a CEC rotation of members is needed in order to provide public legitimacy of election results.

Technical amendments to election law should be passed before the start of election campaign – it is necessary to repeal the provision on use of border service' data for voters' lists formation, to permit bodies responsible for register to prepare provisional voters' lists for early elections, simplify voting tabulation procedures on polling stations etc.

Early local elections will be held November 30th in more than 100 settlements, including such cities as Rivne, Mukacheve, Feodosiya, Tsurupinsk, Kreminna and others. If early parliamentary elections will be held in 2008, it would provoke additional hazards and chaos in election process organization in these settlements. Such aspects of election process as commissions' formation, voters' lists, agitation etc. would be affected.

## #10

\*\*On September 2, when the Rada reconvened, the Tymoshenko Bloc and Our Ukraine, still officially part of the ruling coalition, clashed over a resolution regarding the war in Georgia. The Tymoshenko Bloc did not want to put the question as the first item on the agenda, but Our Ukraine prevailed. Each of the five Rada factions presented at least one resolution (two in the

case of the Communists, and four for Our Ukraine). All resolutions failed to receive the necessary majority – since Our Ukraine voted against the Tymoshenko Bloc resolution and vice versa. As a result, the Parliament of Ukraine was unable to express an opinion on the war. The divisions among factions were clear. The Communists essentially reproduced the official narrative of the Russian government. The Party of Regions focused on Ukraine’s allegedly “illegal” sale of weapons to Georgia and called for an inquiry. The parliamentary leader of the Tymoshenko Bloc, Ivan Korolenko, said, in so many words, that the war in Georgia was “a foreign war” that did not concern Ukraine. Our Ukraine, lacking discipline, submitted four resolutions, three of them condemning Russia for “aggression”. The term “aggression”, however, was absent from the resolution of its parliamentary leader, Volodymyr Korolenko, which, in tone and substance, was very close to the statement of the European Union that had been issued the day before. The Communists also tabled a resolution boldly calling for the recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Eighty percent of deputies from the Party of Regions voted in favor, while the Tymoshenko Bloc, Our Ukraine (and the small Lytvyn Bloc) were against. This is the only instance, on that fateful September 2, when the Tymoshenko Bloc and Our Ukraine voted together. The translation of the Tymoshenko Bloc and Our Ukraine draft resolutions on the war appears below –DA\*\*

Draft entered by the national deputy of Ukraine Kyrylenko V.A. (Our Ukraine)

#### DECLARATION OF THE VERKHOVNA RADA CONCERNING THE RUSSIAN-GEORGIAN CONFLICT

[translated by Nykolai Bilaniuk for UKL]

The Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine is deeply disturbed by the Russian-Georgian armed conflict and its consequences for Europe and the world.

The Verkhovna Rada condemns the use of armed force by any side, and further escalation of the conflict. We express our deep sorrow for the loss of human life, and also for other significant losses, that have been endured by various territories of Georgia consequent to the military actions.

The armed attack of the Russian Federation against Georgia, and also the consequent recognition by Russia of the independence of Abkhazia and Southern Ossetia, are unequivocal violations of key standards of international law and are a challenge to the whole world.

We condemn such actions and support the independence and territorial integrity of Georgia.

The Verkhovna Rada endorses the peacekeeping efforts of the President of Ukraine, and also the efforts of EU member states and NATO, which have sought the end to military actions between Russia and Georgia. At the same time it is clear that the Russian military did not act consistent with a peacekeeping mission, insofar as they took part in military actions on behalf of one side of the conflict, and further did so far beyond the boundaries of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

A precondition for lasting peace and stability in the Caucasus must be the the withdrawl of the Russian military from the entire territory of Georgia and the replacement of the Russian

contingent in Abkhazia and South Ossetia with peacekeeping forces of an authoritative international organization, such as the UN, OSCE, the EU, or NATO.

Apart from this, the Verkhovna Rada expresses its concern over the use of the Russian Black Sea Fleet base in the city of Sevastopol for missions that are incompatible with the deployment status of the Black Sea Fleet on the territory of Ukraine.

The Verkhovna Rada calls upon the European and world community to actively pursue the maintenance of peace and stability in Europe and to secure the unconditional adherence to standards of international law and respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of every country.

The Speaker of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine

VOTING RESULTS - For - 72

Party of Regions - 0, Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc - 5, Our Ukraine - National Self-Defence - 67, Communists - 0, Lytvyn Bloc - 0.

#11

Draft entered by the national deputy of Ukraine Kyrylenko I. H. (Tymoshenko Bloc)

#### DECLARATION OF THE VERKHOVNA RADA CONCERNING THE CONFLICT BETWEEN RUSSIA AND GEORGIA

[translated by Nykolai Bilaniuk for UKL]

The Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine is deeply disturbed by the armed conflict between Russia and Georgia and its serious negative consequences for regional safety in Europe and the world. The Verkhovna Rada condemns the use of armed force by any side, all unilateral steps, and the disproportionate use of force which lead to escalation of the conflict.

We express our deep sorrow in view of the destruction and the development of a situation that led to the suffering of a peaceful population, to an increase in the number of refugees, the ruin of social and economic infrastructure, and which threatens to grow into a humanitarian catastrophe.

The Verkhovna Rada holds that as the basis of a peaceful and lasting resolution of this conflict, all sides should respect the principles of independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity, which are distinguished in and acknowledged by international law and resolutions of the Security Council of the United Nations, and the joint position of the European Union, which is affirmed in the resolutions of the European Union concerning the situation in Georgia.

The Verkhovna Rada calls for the unconditional carrying out of all elements, without exception, of the plan for a peaceful resolution agreed upon by the sides with the mediation of the European Union. This is the plan that has been signed by the presidents of Russia, Georgia, and France.

The Verkhovna Rada calls upon the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine to use all necessary means to give effective humanitarian aid to all who have suffered, without any discrimination. The Verkhovna Rada expresses its support for a more active and co-ordinated participation by

Ukraine in the present and future peacekeeping and humanitarian efforts within the framework of the UN and OSCE, and also in the framework of euro-security and defence policies of the European Union.

The Verkhovna Rada regards as necessary the application of all substantial political and legal instruments in the framework of existing bilateral intergovernmental institutions of Ukraine and Russia, for the purpose of establishing and regulating all processes concerning the basing of the Black Sea Fleet of the Russian Federation on the territory of Ukraine. The Verkhovna Rada calls upon all responsible political forces to refrain from the use of radical rhetoric and of the temptation to transfer questions of regional security into the internal political arena.

The Speaker of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine

VOTING RESULTS - For - 167

Party of Regions - 0, Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc - 152, Our Ukraine - National Self-Defence - 15, Communists - 0, Lytvyn Bloc - 0.

#12

Excerpts from two representative surveys by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS) on popular perceptions of the war in Georgia

Conducted on 30 August-8 September 2008

[thanks to Valeriy Khmelko for sharing the data]

Who, in your opinion, is responsible for the beginning of large-scale military action in South Ossetia?

Georgia 38,4%

Russia 20%

South Ossetia 1,5%

All three 17.5%

Hard to say 22,6%

Which position should take Ukraine regarding the conflict between Georgia, South Ossetia and Russia?

Support Georgia 10%

Support South Ossetia and Russia 15,1%

Keep a neutral stance 65,2%

Hard to say 9.7%

In your opinion, which position expressed by Ukrainian politicians represent the national interests of Ukraine?

Party of Regions Leader Yanukovich 22,8%

Prime Minister Tymoshenko 18,1%

President Yushchenko 16.5%

Others 10,2%

None or no opinion 44,7%

Does a military threat exist in Ukraine in case of an aggravation of the conflict between Russia and Georgia, taking into account the fact that the Black Sea Fleet is based in Sevastopol?

Yes 14,4%

Probably yes 20,4%

Probably no 26,9%

No 25%

Hard to say 13.2%

According to the Treaty between Ukraine and Russia, the terms of the lease of the Black Sea Fleet in Sevastopol end in 2017. How should Ukraine act regarding the withdrawal of the Black Sea Fleet to Russia?

Insist on the withdrawal of the Fleet from the territory of Ukraine in the near future 14.8%

Insist on the withdrawal of the Fleet from the territory of Ukraine in 2017, 27.3%

Prolong the lease of the Fleet in the territory of Ukraine after 2017, 38.0%

Hard to say, 19.9%

Which military security option is the best for Ukraine?

Joining a military union with Russia 28,3%

Joining NATO 17.4%

Creating in Europe a new system of collective security with only EU members 10.6%

Not joining any bloc 25.3%

Reestablishing the nuclear status of Ukraine 8%

Hard to say 10.4%

How would you vote, if a referendum were to take place next week on:

Ukraine joining the European Union, Yes 46,5%, No 32,6% unit

Ukraine joining NATO, Yes 22.2%, No 64,8%

Ukraine joining the Union of Russia and Belarus, Yes 59.7%, No 24.8%

[Priednannia Ukrainy do Soiuzy Rossii i Belarus: it isn't clear to what extent respondents understood this to mean a military union with Russia and Belarus –UKL

#13

Russian Passports as Moscow's Geopolitical Tool

by Taras Kuzio

Eurasia Daily Monitor, 15 September 2008

The official protest by the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) on September 11 over the allegedly “unfriendly” attitudes of the Ukrainian authorities to Russia was met by a stern response on the same day by Ukraine’s Foreign Ministry ([www.mfa.gov.ua](http://www.mfa.gov.ua)). Russia’s MFA protested about President Viktor Yushchenko’s support for Georgia, including supplying “heavy

military hardware"; Ukraine's drive to join NATO "against the will of the Ukrainian people"; "attempts by the Ukrainian authorities to reconsider our common history in an anti-Russian spirit"; and the standard complaint about official hostility to the Russian language.

Ukraine's response pointed to Russia's inability, despite nearly two decades of Ukrainian independence, to accept Ukraine as an "independent state." Ukraine's MFA also described Ukraine as "under no circumstances belonging to the so-called 'privileged interests' of any country."

The Russian protest also complained about the "practice of banning Russian deputies and eminent politicians from entering Ukraine." The following day Russian Duma deputy Viktor Vodolatsky was refused entry into Ukraine to attend a coordinating council meeting of Cossack Hetmans (leaders) from Ukraine, Russia, Belarus, and Moldova's Trans-Dniestr region. The week before, Russian political technologist Sergei Markov was refused entry into Ukraine.

Russia has retaliated by creating a long list of Ukrainian politicians and businessmen banned from entering Russia. It includes the head of NUNS Vyacheslav Kyrylenko, Petro Yushchenko (the president's brother and a NUNS deputy), the governors of Kyiv and Kharkiv, BYuT head of the parliamentary committee on foreign affairs, heads of the armaments company Ukrspetsexport, and others ([www.korrespondent.com.ua](http://www.korrespondent.com.ua), September 15).

Ukraine's MFA warned "that attempts by Russia to destabilize the situation in Ukraine through fifth columnists who for some reason position themselves as the 'healthy political forces of the country' have no prospects." The accusations and the very tone of the exchange are at odds with Prime Minister Vladimir Putin's assurances that "Crimea is not disputable territory" (German ARD television, August 29).

Leon Aron of the Washington-based American Enterprise Institute warned in *The Wall Street Journal* (September 10) that "Russia's Next Target Could Be Ukraine." The Moscow city council is providing \$34 million in support of "compatriots" abroad.

Aron warns of a scenario in which Russia takes control over-night of the port of Sevastopol, which might be "impossible to reverse without a large-scale war." The EU's unwillingness to deal with Russia's new assertiveness since August 8 has demonstrated the vacuous nature of its European Common Foreign and Security Policy. If the EU has permitted Russia to get away with de facto annexation of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, why would it react any differently to a Russian annexation of the Crimea?

The September 9 EU-Ukraine summit threw "away a golden opportunity to stabilize [Ukraine's] eastern frontier and encourage political and economic reform in Kiev" (*Financial Times*, September 10). The EU "foolishly ducked a chance to throw the country a political and economic lifeline" (*The Economist*, September 11).

Two arguments why West European states, such as Germany, Italy, and France, have not supported NATO or EU enlargement to Ukraine and Georgia do not stand up. First, Germany, Italy, and France do not support either NATO or EU enlargement, although it is only the former

that is usually considered likely to “antagonize” Russia. Second, energy links to Russia are not a factor in appeasing Russia. France, Italy, and Germany are only reliant for 26 percent, 30 percent, and 39 percent, respectively, of their gas imports from Russia. Poland, Lithuania, Bulgaria, and Slovakia, which support NATO and EU enlargement to Ukraine, import respectively 61 percent, 84 percent, 94 percent, and 100 percent of their gas from Russia.

Ukrainian authorities have become highly sensitive to the threat of a Russian policy of destabilization since the Kremlin invasion of Georgia. One particular area of concern is the issuing of Russian passports to Ukrainian citizens in the light of Russia’s pretext of coming to the “defense” of Russian citizens in the two frozen conflicts where Russia had illegally distributed passports.

Ukraine’s Minister of Foreign Affairs Volodymyr Ohryzko said that Ukraine’s repeated protests to the Russian consulate in Simferopol over its distributing of passports continue to be ignored. Ohryzko announced that the Security Service, prosecutor’s office, Interior Ministry, and MFA were now investigating the problem ([www.mfa.gov.ua](http://www.mfa.gov.ua), September 6). Ukraine’s Ambassador to Slovakia Inna Ohnivets, who previously worked on this issue, told of repeated Ukrainian demands to the Russian Consulate in the Crimea to halt the practice ([www.bbc.co.uk/Ukrainian](http://www.bbc.co.uk/Ukrainian), August 28).

A week after Ohryzko’s comments, 34 inhabitants of Sevastopol who maintain dual citizenship had their Ukrainian citizenship withdrawn. Further investigations have located 1,595 inhabitants of Sevastopol, primarily serving on the Black Sea Fleet, who have dual citizenship, which is banned by Ukrainian law ([www.pravda.com.ua](http://www.pravda.com.ua), September 13).

Both political forces in the Orange coalition have raised the issue of the distribution of Russian passports as a threat to Ukrainian security. Our Ukraine-Self Defense deputy Volodymyr Stretovych warned that increasing the number of Russian citizens in the Crimea would give Russia, as in Georgia, a pretext to come to the “defense” of its citizens ([www.nuns.com.ua](http://www.nuns.com.ua), August 13, 15). Deputy Nuns faction leader Borys Tarasiuk described the distribution of passports as Russia’s “secret aggression against Ukrainian citizens.” Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc deputies have drawn up a draft law making the obtaining of dual citizenship a criminal offence ([www.pravda.com.ua](http://www.pravda.com.ua), September 9).

The problem Ukrainian authorities are faced with is that they do not have concrete data on the number of Russian passports distributed in the Crimea. During Leonid Kuchma’s decade in office from 1994 to 2004 the Ukrainian authorities turned a blind eye to the illegal practice. Estimates of the number of Russian passport holders in the Crimea range from a low of 6,000 (Newsweek, August 23) to 100,000 (Los Angeles Times, August 25).

Consequently, the EU is ignoring the fact that the consequences for European security of Russian destabilization in the Crimea would be far more severe than that of Russia’s invasion of Georgia.

#14

Passport Hysterics  
by Mikhail Tulskiy

Argumenty Nedeli, 25 September 2008  
[from Johnson's Russia List, 3 October 2008]

On 10-12 September the State Duma adopted in the second and third readings amendments to the Law on Russian Federation Citizenship, simplifying the acquisition of Russian citizenship for foreigners and stateless persons who move to Russia under the Program for Resettlement of Fellow Countrymen. Although the amendments did not deal with measures to grant citizenship to persons residing outside the Russian Federation, they elicited natural hysterics on the part of Ukrainian nationalists, who began to fantasize about the prospect of Russia issuing passports to half the Ukrainian populace, following which it would appropriate for itself the territory in which they live...

In actuality, the Russian Federation State Duma adopted these amendments in the first reading back in April. This was done primarily because under the Program for Resettlement of Fellow Countrymen, only 900 Russian-speaking people moved to the Russian Federation from the CIS in 2007 instead of the planned 50,000. But now they will be able to obtain citizenship without meeting the requirement of continuous five-year residence in Russian Federation territory. They need only obtain a residence permit for the region chosen, as prescribed by the Program, from among those regions participating in the Program.

The first person to address the threat of "illegal 'passportization' of citizens of Ukraine" was Oksana Bilozir, deputy from Yushchenko's Our Ukraine party, who stated on 5 September: "This is an important question for Ukraine. After all, the mass issue of Russian and Romanian passports to Ukrainians is in essence a direct path to future annexation of the territory of our state." Incidentally, no one talks about Romanian passports any more (which as many as 20 percent of Moldovan residents have already received). Only the subject of "the Russian threat" has lately been discussed.

On 11 September two deputies from the Timoshenko faction -- Viktor Shvets and Vladimir Makiyenko -- introduced amendments in the Rada that threaten up to five years in prison for dual citizenship! While the Sevastopol procuracy stated that it had identified 1,595 military servicemen of the Black Sea Fleet who held Russian Federation citizenship and simultaneously "obtained Ukrainian passports, which is prohibited by law."

The next day Vsevolod Loskutov, counselor of the Russian Federation Embassy in Ukraine, was compelled to react to the nationalist hysterics: "All passports are issued by decision of the center in Moscow. We merely draw up the documents and send them to Moscow. For this reason, to say that we are in the business of distributing passports amounts to blatant provocation and is simply ludicrous. In addition, with adoption of the 2002 Law on Russian Federation Citizenship, it has become very, very difficult to obtain a Russian Federation passport. This is a very complicated procedure today."

Unbiased statistics may provide an even tougher response to all the "fears" and "nightmares" that loom in front of Bandera's heirs. In fact, not only is the Russian Federation not increasing its issue of Russian passports, it is steadily reducing them. Thus, according to data from the Federal Migration Service, 508,457 individuals were accepted or reinstated for Russian Federation

citizenship in 2005; in 2006, the number was 371,782 individuals; in 2007 -- 361,952; and in the first half of this year -- 194,157 individuals. Some 350,000 people in all are expected to acquire citizenship this year, next year -- only 180,000, and in 2010 -- just 50,000 total! In this regard, we must take into account the fact that in most cases citizenship is granted to inhabitants of Russia, not inhabitants of the CIS countries. In 2007, for example, 286,956 individuals came to the Russian Federation from other countries and registered for permanent residence in our country -- these people account for the lion's share of acquisition of Russian citizenship...

As far as the numbers of Russian citizens in regions of Ukraine are concerned, we note a somewhat significant number only in Sevastopol. According to the census conducted in late 2001, 3.2 percent of the residents here held Russian citizenship. The percentage of Russian citizens in the rest of Crimea is quite low -- less than 0.6 percent. And in such Russian-speaking oblasts as Donetsk, Luhansk, Kharkiv, Dnipropetrovsk, or Odessa, Russian citizens comprise 0.2 percent or less. In Odessa Oblast the number of Moldovan citizens is even greater than that of Russian citizens... So the threat of "Russian passport intervention" is, to put it mildly, very greatly exaggerated by Ukrainian nationalists.

The only year during which the number of Russian citizens abroad increased appreciably was 2003. Their numbers grew at that time by 206,000, and almost half of the increase was attributable to Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The reason for the mass issue of passports there in 2003 does not in any way reflect Russia's desire "to take these republics in hand," but precisely the opposite -- a desire to avoid this prospect. To the very end Russia "thirsted" to provide passports to those inhabitants of Abkhazia and South Ossetia who desired to become Russian citizens, before the point was reached where inhabitants of both republics found themselves facing the threat of becoming stateless persons and persons without rights. After all, the Russian Federation stopped recognizing Soviet passports effective 1 January 2004. It was only in view of the danger that inhabitants of Abkhazia and South Ossetia would not have any internationally recognized documents that Russian authorities were gracious and issued them Russian passports.

#15

Merkel Slows NATO Bids by Georgia and Ukraine

As German Leader Delays Road Map, Kiev Takes a Step Closer to Russia

By Marc Champion

Wall Street Journal, 3 October 2008

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization won't give Georgia and Ukraine a road map to membership at a meeting later this year, German Chancellor Angela Merkel said Thursday.

Meanwhile, Kiev took a step away from the West and closer to Moscow, as Ukraine's Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko announced gas deals with Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin and voiced support for Russian accession to the World Trade Organization.

Mrs. Merkel's rejection of a NATO track for Georgia and Ukraine, at a news conference with Russian President Dmitry Medvedev in St. Petersburg, would effectively act as a veto. The Western military alliance operates by consensus.

U.S. officials had hoped a NATO ministerial meeting set for December might be the occasion for the alliance to extend a so-called Membership Action Plan, or MAP, to the two ex-Soviet States. However, any quick move toward their NATO membership grew less likely after Georgia's five-day war with Russia in August.

The U.S. State Department declined to comment, saying it hadn't seen or heard Mrs. Merkel's remarks.

Russia opposes NATO expansion to include more countries of the ex-Soviet Union beyond the three Baltic states that joined the U.S.-led alliance in 2004. Russian leaders have claimed Georgia's NATO aspirations encouraged it to take military action that triggered the August invasion. Georgia and Western nations have called Russia the aggressor.

Georgian Integration Minister Temuri Yakobashvili said it would have been better for Mrs. Merkel to wait to make her decision in December, and base it on NATO's reports on Georgia's progress toward meeting the alliance's criteria for MAP. "This is becoming a highly politicized, rather than a technical, performance-based decision," he said.

Mrs. Merkel also opposed MAP for Georgia and Ukraine before the alliance's last summit in April, where NATO members split, despite efforts by President George W. Bush to persuade reluctant European NATO leaders to back the plan. As a result, no road map was offered, but the decision was to be reviewed in December.

Georgian and some U.S. officials believe NATO's failure in April to show clear commitment to Georgia encouraged Moscow to prepare Abkhazia and South Ossetia, two Russian-controlled separatist territories within Georgia, for independence during the summer -- and then to invade. Russia says it attacked in response to a Georgian attempt at genocide against South Ossetian civilians.

Membership in NATO can come as long as a decade after the start of MAP. But Mrs. Merkel argued ahead of the April summit that the move would provoke Russia unnecessarily, and that so long as Georgia had two open territorial disputes it wasn't a suitable NATO member. NATO guarantees it will defend members of the alliance when necessary.

Moscow has been just as determined in opposing efforts by Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko to lead his country into NATO. Since the Georgia conflict, Mr. Yushchenko's pro-Western coalition with his political rival Prime Minister Tymoshenko has disintegrated, damping hopes of NATO accession.

Ms. Tymoshenko has taken a much softer line toward Moscow than Mr. Yushchenko and has declined to criticize Russian actions. In Moscow Thursday, she secured a deal with Mr. Putin on natural gas supplies to Ukraine.

While details were unclear, Ms. Tymoshenko said the two sides had agreed to set a three-year transition for Russia to raise the price at which it sells gas to Ukraine to world-market levels,

according to news agency reports. Ukraine now pays less than half the global market price for gas.

Nevertheless, tensions persist between Kiev and Moscow. Mr. Putin on Thursday again accused Ukrainian personnel of manning guns that shot down Russian aircraft during the war in Georgia.

#16

Can Europe Survive Germany?

by Alexander Motyl

The Atlantic Council website, [www.acus.org](http://www.acus.org), 2 October 2008

Alexander J. Motyl is a professor of political science at Rutgers University-Newark.

If Europe ever dies, Germany will have killed it.

The community of values that Europe is supposed to be —one that claims to embody democracy and human rights and always gives preference to soft power over hard —can survive only as long as its largest state shares those values.

Russia is the test that Germany failed. As Vladimir Putin steered his country in an unabashedly authoritarian and neo-imperialist direction, Germany showered him with praise. When Chancellor Gerhard Schröder called Putin a "true democrat" at the height of Ukraine's Orange Revolution in late 2004, he effectively declared democratic Ukraine's Western aspirations incompatible with Germany's relations with an authoritarian Russia and thereby repudiated democracy.

Last spring's German declaration of solidarity with Putin's opposition to Ukraine's and Georgia's possible NATO membership also revealed the triumph of hard-nosed geopolitics over democratic values and soft power. Chancellor Angela Merkel's endorsement of the logic of Putin's opposition — that foreign-policy decisions made by Ukraine's democratically elected political elites are undemocratic while only those endorsed in popular opinion polls by its population are democratic — was a direct repudiation of Ukraine's democratic institutions and a backhand endorsement of Putin's dismantling of democracy in Russia. Her September 10th designation of Russia's invasion of Georgia as a mere "controversy" that should not overshadow Germany's "shared interests" with Russia went even further than Schröder in sacrificing non-Russian democracy to Russian dictatorship.

Germany's indifference to democratic values is a puzzle. After all, Germany should know better. It devastated Ukraine, Belarus, and Poland in two world wars; it perpetrated the Holocaust along with a variety of other genocides against Roma and Slavs in Eastern Europe; and it was responsible for the deaths of almost 2 million Ukrainians in World War I and 8 million in World War II. (As Erich Koch, Hitler's ruthless Reichskommissar of Ukraine, said, "I will pump every last thing out of this country. I did not come here to spread bliss.") One would have expected Germany to be especially sensitive to the democratic aspirations and security concerns of the peoples it came closest to annihilating. Instead, Germany has consistently preferred authoritarian

Russia to its democratic non-Russian neighbors.

Gas goes some way in explaining Berlin's preferential option for the Kremlin, but not quite. After all, the Eastern Europeans most critical of Russia —such as Poland and the Baltic states — are far more dependent on Russian gas than Germany. Lucrative pipeline deals and other commercial ties also don't do the trick: economic logic should dictate a closer alliance with the United States, Germany's largest trading partner, but instead German policy makers are frequently more anti-American in their rhetoric and policy than anti-Russian.

A closer look at history may help explain Germany's anomalous behavior. In 1922, Weimar Germany signed the Treaty of Rapallo with Soviet Russia, thereby paving the way for extensive economic and military cooperation that isolated, and helped destabilize, the fledgling states of East Central Europe. In 1938, the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact led to the division of Poland by Hitler and Stalin. Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, Germany willingly accepted Soviet hegemony in the satellite states (and even snubbed the Solidarity movement), in exchange for rapprochement with East Germany. The Schröder-Putin pipeline deal of late 2005 and Merkel's endorsement of the logic of Putin's opposition to Ukraine's and Georgia's integration into Euro-Atlantic structures continue this pattern.

In all five instances, radically different German regimes consistently pursued the same foreign policy goal. Whether unstable and democratic as in 1922, powerful and totalitarian as in 1938, stable and democratic as during the Cold War, or powerful and democratic as today —German elites, whether Christian Democrats, Social Democrats, or Nazis, forged alliances with an authoritarian Russia at the expense of their democratic neighbors in Eastern Europe. This overarching vision of Germany's interests is unabashedly geopolitical, pointing to a possible reassertion in today's Germany of the Realpolitik political culture that dominated German foreign policy after unification in 1871 and that produced the disasters of the two world wars.

It's hard to see how Europe —whether as an ethical community or as the European Union — can survive Germany's return to great-power thinking and politics. A truly democratic club of countries cannot unconditionally prefer authoritarianism to democracy in all its dealings with its eastern neighbors. A truly functioning EU —whether as a club of equals or as a super-state — cannot exist if its largest member is committed to its own interests above all others. (It was Schröder, after all, who in the run-up to the Iraq War declared that he would ignore a UN resolution to support the U.S. invasion.)

Since the problem is political culture, any effective solution must focus on it as well. The Holocaust points the way to just how German elites might be swayed to think differently about politics. The shame of six million dead Jews has kept Germany honest in its dealings with Israel. The shame of the millions of Poles, Ukrainians, and Belarusians who were killed in two world wars may be the only way to remind Berlin that it cannot just ignore the values and interests of the countries that lie east of Germany and west of Russia in its ruthless pursuit of self-interest. And the ethical community that is supposed to be Europe could only benefit from a recognition that human rights also exist outside the European Union's current borders.

#17

Cold and Hot from Russia [Kalt und warm aus Russland]

Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 20 September 2008

[http://www.nzz.ch/nachrichten/international/kalt\\_und\\_warm\\_aus\\_russland\\_1.862161.html](http://www.nzz.ch/nachrichten/international/kalt_und_warm_aus_russland_1.862161.html)

[translated by Nykolai Bilaniuk for UKL]

>From the East it blows alternately cold and hot, with Moscow's martial muscle rhetoric followed by the music of the shawm. President Medvedev claims relations with Washington could be repaired if only healthy human understanding were to triumph over Cold War thinking. So much emphasis is placed on this that one must pay attention. If this signals a change in Russian policy, so much the better, because thinking in terms of the Cold War is predominantly at home in the Kremlin. Spheres of influence are a Russian speciality, the "near abroad" is a Russian invention, and bold denunciation of the "expansion of NATO to the borders of Russia" is a key Russian motif.

The short August war in Georgia is over, and has become the subject of intellectual examination. One is occupied with determining who fired the first shot, as if that were ascertainable and even the central question. There was no archduke who fell victim to an assassination attempt in Tskhinvali, probably however there were countless provocations and hostile actions, which make it impossible to reconstruct the blame for the aggression that emerged. The analysis instead serves to find arguments for future policy directions, including domestic policy. This is especially true for Germany. Medvedev's charge that his "colleague" Sakashvili is psychologically unstable and uses drugs may also find fertile ground in the West.

### Intellectual Strategies

The International Institute for Strategic Studies in London has found there was "a failure of strategy," and by this it really means that all participants involved were net losers. The point of view from which this judgement is delivered - and it sounds worthy of a Nobel Prize - is the conviction that a skillful strategy and well thought out behavior would have prevented this unfortunate development. Unfortunately reality is not always "skillful" and results from actions whose effects cannot always be foreseen with one hundred fifty percent confidence. The Institute also supports those Europeans who at the Bucarest NATO summit prevented Georgia and Ukraine from being integrated into membership action plans. For his part President Bush is scolded because he nevertheless allowed the admission of these countries in principle to be recorded in the final communique.

The fact that the Bucarest compromise was not a good idea has become well known in the meantime. However, whether the August war would have been more readily prevented by French-German recoiling in fear before Russian anger, or by American defiance is something about which scholars can still argue. What Moscow could clearly and unambiguously take home from the summit meeting was the disunity of the alliance. In any case those who now argue against spheres of interests should realize that without such zones, individual nations themselves determine whether they now wish to join an alliance or not. In case of Ukraine, it seems a majority of the population is against joining at present - thus there can be no membership - but in case of Georgia a majority seems to favour NATO. Without referendums, this will not carry

much weight either way.

## Soviet Reflexes

NATO already bordered the Soviet Union, and in the Caucasus Region no less. The fact that the alliance is overstretched and cannot meet all its obligations is also nested in the Cold War way of thinking. Defense assistance was not considered in the debate concerning Georgia - Georgia is not a member, and even if it had been one, the leading powers of the alliance would have had to carefully evaluate, what could have been done under those concrete circumstances in August. It is not their inclination to get drawn into any old local war. Automatic response is not in the cards, and this is well known in Moscow too.

Thus the question is purely political - at the end of the Cold War, NATO proclaimed itself again and again to be a political organization. It would therefore be a demand of the faculty of reason and a skillful strategy to consider how Europe could free itself from Russian pressure over its energy supply. The answers are not floating in the air.

#18

EU's Rebuff for Ukraine Sours Summit

by Tony Barber in Paris

Financial Times, 10 September 2008

The European Union yesterday declined to offer Ukraine a clear path to EU membership, frustrating Ukrainian officials who said the bloc had thrown away a golden opportunity to stabilise its eastern frontier and encourage political and economic reform in Kiev.

A communiqué issued at an EU-Ukrainian summit set out a framework for closer ties between Kiev and the 27-nation bloc, but omitted the crucial words "membership perspective" to describe Ukraine's future relationship with the EU.

Ukraine, a country of 46m people wedged between the EU and Russia, had hoped that Moscow's military assault on Georgia last month, and its subsequent attempt to partition the former Soviet republic, might prompt the EU to go the extra mile.

The communiqué affirmed the EU's commitment to Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity, and held out the prospect of agreements on free trade and easier travel for Ukrainians to EU countries, but stopped short of a promise of EU accession.

"Be clear that this agreement shuts no door, and maybe it opens some doors. This is the most we could offer, but I believe it to be a substantial step," Nicolas Sarkozy, France's president, told reporters.

Diplomats said Germany and the Netherlands, and to a lesser extent Belgium, were the most reluctant to state clearly that Ukraine could one day join the EU.

The three Baltic states, the Czech Republic, Poland, Sweden and the UK all sympathised with

Kiev's aspirations while recognising that accession was not an immediate possibility.

France, which holds the EU's rotating presidency, appreciated the need to send positive signals to Kiev, but was unwilling to make a strong commitment to Ukraine without a shift in the German and Dutch positions, diplomats said.

Ukraine did its cause little good last week when the ruling coalition split in acrimony, enhancing the nation's reputation for political instability.

For now, Ukraine will have to make do with an "association agreement" with the EU - a pact that for Balkan countries such as Albania, Macedonia and Serbia represents the first step on the path to membership, but for Ukraine carries no such implications.

The association agreement is expected to be ready in about a year, and President Viktor Yushchenko said yesterday he looked forward to signing it. "We've made remarkable progress over the past 12 months," he said, making it clear he had not abandoned hope Ukraine could eventually join the EU.

But some Ukrainian officials said their government might be wary of signing the association accord lest this be interpreted as Kiev's formal acceptance of a status falling permanently short of membership.

EU officials put a positive gloss on yesterday's summit, stressing the communiqué did not explicitly exclude EU accession. But Ukraine fears support for Kiev's aspirations may fade if the crisis in Georgia calms down.

#19

Ukraine a "European State"? Not So Clear

by Michaël Prazan, Op/Ed

Le Monde, 15 September 2008

[translated by Lama Mourad for UKL]

Michaël Prazan is a writer and documentary filmmaker. [His latest film, released in 2006, is The Nanking Massacre: Memory and Oblivion --UKL]

"Ukraine, a European country, shares common values and history with the states of the European Union." And so read the joint declaration written at the onset of the Ukraine-EU summit held under the guidance of French president Nicolas Sarkozy in Paris on September 9, serving as an official invitation for Ukraine's candidacy for European integration, starting as early as 2009.

Relatively unshaken by the disastrous escapade led by President Mikheil Saakashvili and the ensuing Russian demonstration of force, European leaders insist that Ukraine should become part of the Union, thus taking on a truly "European" identity.

Yet, Russian aspirations towards the Crimea, a Russian-speaking peninsula highly endowed with minerals and hydrocarbons are comparable, and arguably greater, to those towards South

Ossetia. While Russia does not foresee an annexation of the Crimea in the near future – an act incidentally demanded by a majority of Crimeans – , based on geostrategic considerations, it remains one of the most sensitive zones in the region. If Ukraine were to join the European Union, the Crimea would serve, at best, as an inextricable node of the forthcoming Cold War, and at worst, as the scene of a latent conflict to be deliberated upon by Europeans.

Let us now return to the diction of the previously cited declaration. Foremost; “common [...] history”. Which history do we speak of? In Ukraine, history is primarily a complex continuum where legacies of the Second World War and the Soviet era enjoy more intensity than in other areas. These memories persist to influence the cultural, geographical, and ideological landscapes of the local population.

In Simferopol, capital of the Crimea, Ukrainian is seldom spoken (the word “Ukrainian” is without equivalent in the local dialect), except when condemning the “pro-Western” government of Viktor Yushchenko. The vast majority of Crimeans, with the possible exception of the Tatar minority which had previously pled allegiance to Nazi invaders, identify themselves as Russians, speak Russian, and hold Kyiv in gross disregard. We must note, however, that Ukrainian national identity is paradoxical, to say the least.

Whether on its Southern front with Romania, or its Western front with Poland, invasions and annexations have consistently shaped, and reshaped, the territorial boundaries of Ukraine – so much so that we are led to question which “territorial integrity”, as was adopted by the EU declaration in Paris, should be maintained. The Nazi invasion of June 1941, much like the Soviet annexation ratified at Yalta, has had a lasting effect on the aforementioned integrity.

While the Crimea yearns for the Soviet era, Galicia, a highly nationalist and former Polish territory which is now integrated within Ukraine, mourns the loss of its Nazi allegiance. This reflects the variation in “pro-Western” outlooks, which encompass a vast array of divergent values. Further emblematic of this phenomena: on July 27, the city of Lviv, formerly Lemberg, capital of Galicia, organized, in collaboration with the local television network, a demonstration to honour both the UPA, the Ukrainian nationalist movement which had collaborated with the Nazis (before defecting and turning against them), and the SS Galicia, an auxiliary unit of the SS composed of Ukrainian Nazis charged with the massacre of civilians, most notably in former Yugoslavia.

The proud display of the SS unit’s emblems and colors, as well as the Swastika-adorned posters announcing the event, were a must-see, if only for their presence in the heart of Europe of the future! This gathering further blurs the supposed “common values” that we share with the pro-Western Ukrainians. In Ukraine, being pro-Western is often tantamount to identifying with the UPA or the SS Galicia. This is mostly due to the fact that the dichotomy pitting “pro-Russian” against “pro-Western” follows similar lines as those charted by the previously entrenched antagonisms of the 20th century catastrophes.

“Former combatants” of these nationalist militias are still bestowed medals and decorations by the government of Kiev; a road in Lviv bears the name of Stepan Bandera, a prominent nationalist figure of the 1940s who allied with the German “liberators” in the first months of the

Nazi invasion. The complete annihilation of Galicia's Jewish population by the mobile extermination commandos and their Ukrainian auxiliaries remains an unaddressed taboo.

The genocide perpetrated against the Jewish population, in which a significant portion of the Ukrainian population participated, is subject to incessant historical reconfiguration by the highest instances of state power. Let us remember that the graves strewn across Ukrainian territory, in which the remains of nearly one million Jewish victims of the Nazi regime were thrown, remain commemoration sites solely for Soviets and Jewish organizations; they continue to be the only ones to have erected monuments or steles in memory of the victims. Ukraine, under Viktor Yushchenko, is vaguely democratic and extremely corrupt. It remains more permeable to the patriotic bravery of the former members of the SS Galicia than to the memory of its victims.

For Ephraïm Zuroff, president of the Simon Wiesenthal Centre of Jerusalem and director of the operation "Last Chance" which aims to bring remaining Nazi war criminals to justice, Ukrainian integration into the European Union or NATO will allow, as is the case of the Baltic States which henceforth reject the possibility of trying their former war criminals, will grant Ukraine an implicit approval of its refusal to acknowledge, in all honesty and lucidity, its past. "The worst that could happen, comments Ephraïm Zuroff, is that Ukraine be admitted into the EU or NATO without first having confronted its past and admitted the truth. Once it has been integrated into the EU and NATO, no amount of pressure could thereafter be exerted on it, and the struggle for memory, justice, and truth will have forever been lost."

The independence of former Soviet satellite countries at the onset of the 1990s only tempered, temporarily, the deeply embedded identitarian, linguistic, historical, and geographical fractures which had formed throughout the 20th century. The recent war in South Ossetia, it is feared, could be but a preamble of convulsions to come.

Europe, therefore, would be well advised to reconsider the integration of these countries into the European Union. Finally, on the question of memory: Why insist that Turkey, as a requisite to any possible discussion of its candidacy to the EU, recognize the Armenian genocide, when Ukraine is exonerated in advance of any and all responsibility in the genocide of the Jewish population of Europe and of its current falsification of history?

Nicolas Sarkozy, during the electoral campaign, pronounced himself as adamantly opposed to the integration of Turkey out of fear – he said – of having to manage such issues as the Kurds, Syria, and Iraq on the frontlines of European territory. Yet, in light of all these considerations, in their historical, memorial, and geopolitical aspects, it is starkly clear that integrating countries such as Ukraine (or Georgia) would provoke repercussions of a much larger scale.

#20

After Georgia, What's Next for Russia?

by Agnes Gruda

La Presse (Canada), 5 September 2008

[translated by Lama Mourad for UKL]

The support given yesterday by Vice President Dick Cheney to Georgia's admission into NATO

is but one of the many consequences of the speedy war that has engulfed the Caucasus last month. A month after the initial explosion; a look at the event that changed the world.

Three years ago, Dmitri Rogozin headed a Russian nationalist party, Rodina, which solicited votes during the municipal elections of Moscow. With the goal of increasing public awareness of its fundamentally anti-immigrant platform, the party ran a television advertisement which depicted a fruit vendor with a dark complexion beside a mass of watermelon peels. And there appeared Mr. Rogozin demanding to “let us get rid of this garbage”.

This explicitly racist advertisement instigated such an immense outcry that Rodina was removed from the electoral ballot. Dmitri Rogozin, however, pursued his political career and obtained the strategic position of representative of Moscow in NATO. Last month, while the region was embroiled in the recent conflict, his numerous declarations cemented his reputation as an outspoken diplomat.

For instance, he compared the Georgian attack on South Ossetia to the 9/11 terrorist attack, and to the assassination of Archbishop Franz Ferdinand of Austria, which served as a catalyst for the First World War. Both analogies leave one with the feeling that further military escalations are on the horizon.

This tone is particularly significant since Dmitri Rogozin is not the only one to employ it. “Russia is utilizing a far more aggressive rhetoric in international affairs”, says Chris Schneider, Vice President of International Crisis Group, an independent centre for analysis based out of Brussels and Washington.

“We fear nothing, not even the prospect of a new Cold War”, declared Russian President Dmitri Medvedev while the conflict between Russia and Georgia was beating at its highest point of tension.

When, at the height of the conflict, Poland signed on to an agreement to put US anti-missile interceptors on its territory, the Russian head of state did not hesitate to respond: the decision exposes Poland to military strikes, he warned.

Last Tuesday, President Medvedev came out with a new statement, this time comparing Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili to a “political corpse.”

Aside from his share of responsibility in the upsurge of violence that shook the Caucasian region on August 8, “Saakashvili remains the President of a recognized state, he has been elected twice through what were deemed democratic elections,” asserts Dominique Arel, director of the Chair of Ukrainian Studies at the University of Ottawa.

This expert is extremely concerned by the sudden turn of events and the change in discourse from the Kremlin. He notes that “Russia has made use of an extremely aggressive rhetoric, one previously unheard, even during the Cold War”.

This verbal escalation raises questions on the future intentions of Russia, notes Mark Schneider.

The verbal attacks do not only target Georgia, but include countries such as Ukraine, a country which encompasses a large Russian-speaking population and, like Georgia, aspires to join NATO.

Will Ukraine be the next battlefield between Moscow and a former Soviet republic? Will tensions in the Crimean peninsula, where Russian forces are stationed, lead to an escalation of violence? These scenarios are what many observers, including Dominique Arel, fear. The latter states that Ukraine has long been a part of the Russian empire, and that the notion of empire has regained popularity in Moscow.

“Accusing Russia of wanting to regain its former empire is inaccurate”, rebukes the political scientist Jacques Lévesque. “Moscow simply wishes to reaffirm its interests in the former Soviet-controlled area.”

This reaffirmation, according to this expert on Russia, is achieved through the halting of NATO expansionist ambitions. Mr. Lévesque points out that relations between Russia and the West will face a crucial test at the next meeting of the Foreign Ministers of NATO members, scheduled for December.

Everything has changed

Whether they fear or not the return of the Russian “bear”, most analysts agree on one element: the consequences of the Russian-Georgian conflict greatly surpass the confines of the South Ossetian territory. This war has changed the entire global dynamic.

In its latest report, the International Crisis Group notes that “the Russian-Georgian conflict has transformed the modern geopolitical world, with important consequences for peace and security in Europe.”

“The era of unipolar American hegemony has come to an end,” says Simon Montefiore, a renowned expert on Russia and author of two biographies on Stalin.

It should be noted that the importance attributed to this shift is not unanimous among experts.

While certain analysts refer back to the Cold War, others, such as Jacques Lévesque, indicate that we are not experiencing a new phase of ideological conflicts similar to those experienced in the 1950s and it is highly unlikely that Moscow intends to resume control over all of the former Soviet territory.

“The idea of a new Cold War is misleading,” writes Joschka Fischer, the German former Minister of Foreign Affairs, in *The Guardian*. Despite its affluence in natural resources, Russia of the new millennium, he claims, has neither the power nor the stature of the Soviet Union. Therefore, it is incapable of confronting Washington head on.

Cold War? Tepid War? Going above and beyond these semantic differences, one realization has garnered unanimity: a month ago, retorting Georgia’s attack with a military offensive, Russia began a new chapter in world history.

#21

Kuchma Does Not Deserve Peace

by Taras Kuzio

Kyiv Post, 18 September 2008

<http://www.kyivpost.com/opinion/29766>

The former Ukrainian president should be investigated for abuses in office, not enjoying retirement.

Peru and Ukraine are separated by thousands of kilometers, but have two factors in common. First, the New York–based Freedom House ranks them both as “free” because their political and civil liberties are graded between 2 and 3 on a scale of 7, with 1 being the best score. Secondly, both had tape scandals eight years ago. But the similarities end there.

The anniversary of journalist Georgiy Gongadze’s abduction on Sept. 16 led to Ukraine’s tape scandal two months later, when Socialist Party leader Oleksandr Moroz revealed tape recordings to a stunned Ukrainian parliament. The recordings implicated President Leonid Kuchma in Gongadze’s disappearance.

The significance of the ensuing Kuchmagate crisis for Ukrainian politics cannot be underestimated. Without Kuchmagate, there would have been no Orange Revolution four years later. Without Kuchmagate, Victor Yushchenko would not have been pushed into the opposition from where he launched his candidacy and was elected president.

Yushchenko, therefore, to a certain extent owes his presidency to Gongadze. Though you would not think this was the case after the president broke his solemn promise to investigate the organizers of Gongadze’s murder.

But where Ukraine failed, Peru came out a victor. Unlike Ukraine, Peru has faced its past and, as a consequence, has consolidated its democracy. Ukraine has dodged its past and has had periodic crises since Yushchenko was elected, the current one still unfolding.

Tapes made by the chairman of Peru’s Servicio de Inteligencia Nacional (SIN) Vladimoro Montesinos, and by presidential guard Mykola Melnychenko were leaked and led to similar political crises. President Alberto Fujimoro fled abroad in 2001 and did not finish his term in office. Meanwhile, Kuchma completed his presidential term and remained in Ukraine after having been given, most likely, verbal immunity during the December 2004 roundtables. The tape recordings in the Fujimoro scandal were used in court, whereas in Ukraine, the prosecutor’s office has refused to use the Melnychenko tapes.

Working for President Fujimoro, SIN chairman Montesinos secretly videotaped the numerous bribes he gave to politicians, businessmen, journalists and judges. Montesinos was himself very corrupt with an unexplainable \$600,000 annual salary and \$48 million in Swiss bank accounts. Kuchma’s assets are unknown but allegedly huge after a decade in office.

Peru's "tapegate" began after video footage of a \$15,000 bribe to a Peruvian congressman was leaked to Channel N television. The broadcast of the video on television led to mass protests, similar to what unfurled in Ukraine following the public revelation of the Melnychenko tapes in parliament.

Fujimoro escaped justice by fleeing to Japan. A public trial in his absence charged him with 67 counts of embezzlement, human rights abuses, organizing a death squad and drug smuggling. Twenty-one congressmen, ministers, businessmen, journalists and military officers were jailed and indicted for corruption and abuse of office. By these actions, interim President Valentin Paniagua, who succeeded Fujimoro, restored democracy in Peru.

Fujimoro spent five years in exile in Japan. Montesinos fled to Venezuela, but it extradited him to Peru where he stood trial and was convicted. Fujimoro attempted a political comeback in Peru and landed in Chile in November 2005. Peru requested his extradition on 12 charges, including ordering violence against opponents, illegal telephone tapping, diverting state funds, bribing officials for their loyalty, corrupting and controlling the judiciary and the media.

In September 2007, the Chilean Supreme Court upheld the decision to extradite Fujimoro to Peru. His Peruvian trial was broadcast live on television and in December 2007 he was sentenced to six years imprisonment for some of the charges. His trial on other charges is pending.

Accusations of involvement in the same six counts of abuse of office made against Fujimoro have been also made at different times against Kuchma. But – unlike in Peru – no criminal charges have ever been made against Kuchma and he has not gone on trial. SIN chairman Montesinos was convicted. Former State Security Service chairman Leonid Derkach peacefully lives out his retirement, Interior Minister Yuriy Kravchenko committed 'suicide' before he could give evidence and General Oleksandr Pukach, a key player in the scandal, mysteriously disappeared.

Yushchenko failed to follow up on his promises of bringing the organizers of Gongadze's murder to justice. Yushchenko also never raised other cases of abuse of office under President Kuchma, even though the Melnychenko tapes and many other pieces of evidence point to multiple cases of abuse committed by senior officials during Kuchma's decade in office.

Yushchenko did not follow in President Paniagua's footsteps in bringing justice to his country by cleaning out Peru's elites and justice system. Not a single senior official involved in abuses of office has ever been convicted in Ukraine, unlike in Peru.

Under both the 1996 and 2006 constitutions, Yushchenko's choice of prosecutors, whether Sviatoslav Piskun, one of the three prosecutors who had covered up the organizers of the Gongadze murder during the Kuchma era, or Oleksandr Medvedko, showed no commitment to finding the 'organizers' of Gongadze's murder or improving the rule of law. Prosecutor Mykhailo Potebenko, who covered up Kuchma's involvement the most, was given a state medal by the

president in February of last year.

In the first months after being elected, Yushchenko gave grounds for optimism that the Gongadze murder would be laid to rest. A week after he was elected, Yushchenko promised to bring to trial the organizers of the murder by May 2005. “In Ukraine, we will uncover those who shot journalists and murdered politicians. And these will be very big figures. It is important to get at the truth,” Yushchenko said. For Yushchenko, it was a matter of honor that the organizers be brought to justice and, “without a doubt, this was a high-ranking official.”

Yushchenko broke his word made to Ukrainian voters and to the Council of Europe. Not a single organizer of Gongadze’s murder (nor of other numerous abuses of office under Kuchma) have been convicted. Yushchenko has continued the practice of his two predecessors of not putting any member of the elite on trial. Ukraine’s elites can continue to fear prosecution abroad, but not at home.

Peru’s democracy stood the test of its tape scandal far better and Fujimoro and many other officials were imprisoned. In marked contrast, Kuchma continues to sit in his foundation, only a five minute walk from parliament and Bankova, writing books, giving interviews and fearing nothing for his deeds in the past.

#22

Ukraine, Vanco Energy, and the Russian Mob  
by Myroslav Demydenko

Eurasia Daily Monitor, 16 September 2008

The saga of Houston-based Vanco Energy Company’s conflict with the Ukrainian government over a shady production-sharing agreement (PSA) to explore the Black Sea shelf for oil and gas has taken a new twist.

Recently uncovered evidence suggests that one or more of Vanco Energy Company’s partners in Vanco Prykerchenska Company (VPC), a British Virgin Islands company formed in October 2007, which holds the rights to subsoil exploration on the Black Sea shelf, might be linked to Russian organized crime.

The four parity shareholder partners in VPC are Vanco International (Bermuda), a subsidiary of Vanco Energy Company; the Donbas Fuel and Energy Company (DTEK) owned by Ukrainian tycoon Renat Akhmetov; Integrum Technologies of Austria; and Shadowlight Investments, Ltd., owned by Russian businessman Evgeny Novitsky.

Integrum Technologies has refused to disclose its main investors, and Vanco executives have admitted on a number of occasions that they do not know the identities of the owners of Integrum. These admissions suggest that Vanco could not have conducted due diligence about Integrum before allowing them into the consortium. Evidence suggests, however, that Kyiv Investment Group, a company owned by Ukrainian oligarch Vasyl Khmelnytsky, is one of the hidden partners of Integrum.

Shadowlight Investments, however, has escaped media scrutiny until now. The company was described by Oil and Gas Eurasia (no. 6, June 2008) as an investment company owned by Russian businessman Evgeny Novitsky and that it was established specifically with the objective of funding the energy projects on the Black Sea shelf.

According to a number of reports in the press and the book *Darkness at Dawn-The Rise of the Russian Criminal State* by David Satter (Yale University Press, September 2004), Evgeny Novitsky is alleged to be a member of, or very close to, Russia's Solntsevo organized crime gang.

Satter wrote that Solntsevo had close ties to a Russian company called Sistema, which is linked to Moscow Mayor Yuriy Luzhkov and to the IVK, the information technology company, of which Novitsky was director. Solntsevo, working through the company SV-Holdings, eventually came to own a large share of IVK.

Satter also claims that Novitsky was present at a restaurant in Prague in 1995 where Sergei Mikhailov ("Mikhas"), one of the reputed leaders of the Solntsevo mob, was present along with some 150 other people to celebrate the birthday of Viktor Averin, ("Avera"), also a reputed Solntsevo leader. Novitsky was allegedly held by the Czech police, who raided the party. He was fingerprinted and released.

Satter wrote that the French daily *Le Monde* had received confidential reports by the Russian Internal Ministry (MVD) and the Federal Security Service (FSB) that claimed that Novitsky, as President of Sistema, did not make any decisions without consulting the Solntsevo criminal brotherhood.

Kommersant wrote on July 22, 1997, that an unnamed official of the FBI had revealed the names of three individuals suspected of being "shadow bankers" for the Solntsevo mob, one of whom was Evgeny Novitsky.

The newspaper *Russkiy Telegraf* reported on October 16, 1997, that analysts from the Moscow office of the Department for Combating Organized Crime (RUOP) suspected Novitsky of laundering money for Solntsevo.

On August 24, 1999, the *Moscow Times* reported that Kirill Belyaninov, a journalist for *Novaya Izvestia*, had written an investigative article linking Novitsky and Semen Mogilevich to the Solntsevo group. Gennady Dalalayev, a spokesman for Sistema, refuted the charges and said that suggestions that Novitsky was tied to the Solntsevo gang were "rubbish."

The *Moscow Times* noted that "Retired FBI agent Jim Moody, who was cited as a source in Belyaninov's story, confirmed...that he had spoken with *Novaya Izvestia*. Moody said that Belyaninov's article was 'accurate' in tying Mogilevich to the Solntsevo gang, but he could not confirm the allegations regarding Sistema." Belyaninov, however, insisted that he had documentation, including material from Moscow's Registration Chamber, to back up his allegations. Moody served as the FBI's assistant deputy director for organized crime investigations from 1987 to 1996.

On August 1 Vanco Prykerchenska applied to the arbitral tribunal of the Chamber of Commerce of Stockholm to rule on the legitimacy of the Ukrainian government's revocation in May of a production sharing agreement (PSA) signed on October 19, 2007, with the previous government of Victor Yanukovich.

A statement by the government of Ukraine issued on August 1 noted: "Vanco Prykerchenska Ltd. is not a subsidiary of the U.S. Company Vanco Energy. Vanco Energy is simply a minority shareholder in Vanco Prykerchenska Ltd., an Offshore company dominated by Ukrainian interests and other offshore entities whose ultimate owners remain undisclosed. It is Vanco Prykerchenska, and not Vanco Energy or its subsidiary Vanco International, which recently initiated arbitration against the GoU [Government of Ukraine] in Stockholm."

The revocation of the PSA by Yulia Tymoshenko's government in May was initially condemned by U.S. Ambassador to Ukraine William Taylor, but his position has since shifted to one of neutrality. U.S. Secretary of Commerce Carlos M. Gutierrez said in an address to the American Chamber of Commerce in Kyiv on June 5, 2008: "For the Government of Ukraine to attract investors, especially in those sectors vital to its energy security, it needs to make clear that it respects the sanctity of contracts and the rule of law" ([http://kiev.usembassy.gov/main\\_eng\\_archive-2008.html](http://kiev.usembassy.gov/main_eng_archive-2008.html)).

Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko overturned the government's decision in June. Prime Minister Tymoshenko, however, continued to insist that the Vanco contract was a "corrupt agreement concluded by the previous government" ("BYuT Inform Newsletter," July 22).

If the allegations against Novitsky are proven to be true, Vanco Energy Company in Houston could possibly face charges under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO).

In the August 1 statement by the government of Ukraine, one paragraph appears to be a warning directed at Vanco management: "Given that Vanco Energy Company...is a U.S. corporation and subject to U.S. jurisdiction, the GoU has kept the U.S. government apprised of the situation as it has developed. The U.S. authorities are at the vanguard of the global fight against corruption, and the GoU will continue to work with all of its international partners to advance this investigation and pursue necessary legal steps as appropriate."

#23

New Book:

Vlad Naumescu. 2008. *Modes of Religiosity in Eastern Christianity: Religious Processes and Social Change in Ukraine*. Berlin: Lit Verlag.

This volume offers original insights into the religious transformations taking place in postsocialist western Ukraine. Applying a cognitive theory based on two modes of religiosity, the doctrinal and the imagistic, Vlad Naumescu reveals the mechanisms of reproduction and

change that make the local eastern Christian tradition a living tradition of faith. He combines rich ethnographic materials with historical and theological sources to depict a religion in equilibrium between the two modes, maintaining revelation at the core of its doctrinal corpus. He argues that religion is a potential source for social change that empowers people to act upon reality and transform it. With his innovative exploration of the dynamics of an eastern Christian tradition, Naumescu makes a major contribution to the emerging anthropology of Christianity as well as to studies of postsocialism. Bd. 15, 2008, 272 S., 29,90 , br., ISBN 978-3-8258-9908-0

'In this theoretically ambitious and empirically rich volume, Naumescu offers an engrossing account of the dynamics governing religious transmission and transformation in western Ukrainian Christianity.' Harvey Whitehouse, Institute of Anthropology, Oxford University.

"... provides a well balanced historical overview, much needed for understanding the entanglements of Eastern (and some Western) Christian Churches in postsocialist Ukraine. Yet the major contribution of Naumescu's study is the elaborate theoretical framework of its anthropological analysis. Naumescu's creative use of the "modes of religiosity" theory expands the theoretical horizon for all students of Eastern Christianities." Galia Valtchinova, Bulgarian Academy of Sciences

#24

Date: Wed, 3 Sep 2008 08:29:38 -0500

From: "Bucur-Deckard, Maria" <[mbucur@indiana.edu](mailto:mbucur@indiana.edu)>

The **Heldt Prize** committee [of the Association for Women in Slavic Studies (AWSS)] is pleased to announce the winners of the 2008 competition:

**Best book** by a woman in any area of Slavic/East European/Eurasian studies:

Catherine Wanner, *Communities of the Converted: Ukrainians and Global Evangelism* (Cornell University Press, 2007)

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UKL 430, 9 October 2008

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